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I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom has it that during the presidency of
Franklin Roosevelt, the Supreme Court brought about a nation-
alist revolution in constitutional terms. Indeed, this familiar ac-
count provides a rare piece of common ground occupied both by
those who come to praise what the Supreme Court did during
this period and those who come to bury it.' What this shared un-
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' Among supporters of the Court, the nationalist characterization is prominently ex-
pressed in the work of Bruce Ackerman. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Founda-
tions 105-30 (Belknap 1991) (arguing that the New Deal Court legitimized activist na-
tional government); Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62
U Chi L Rev 475, 572 (1995) ("[The New Deal was] the only moment in our history when
a nationalist and inclusionary movement gained the overwhelming support of every re-
gion, race, and class in America for its revolutionary reforms."). See also Morton J. Hor-
witz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 3 (Oxford 1992) ("The New Deal
constitutional revolution of 1937 represented a fundamental shift in the constitutional
relationship of the states to the federal government."); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional-
ism After the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421, 425 (1987) (The New Deal "produced a mas-
sive shift in the relationship between the federal government and the states" and
"rejected traditional notions of federalism.").
Among opponents of the constitutional revolution, the nationalist characterization is
prominent in the work of Robert Bork. See Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law 57 (Free Press 1989) (arguing that the New Deal Court il-
legitimately centralized power in Washington). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Proper
Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va L Rev 1387, 1443, 1451 (1987) (stating that the New
Deal Court worked "a revolution in constitutional theory" by replacing the system of
enumerated federal powers with "the vast and unwarranted concentration of power in
Congress that remains the hallmark of the modern regulatory state," and that the
"Justices ... rejected the idea of limited federal government and decentralized power");
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers":. In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich L Rev 752, 790-99 (1995) (referring to the "nationalism of
the New Deal" and arguing that the Court's enlargement of the scope of the Commerce
Clause effectively-though illegitimately-abolished judicial enforcement of federalism at
the expense of the reserved powers of the states). Bork states that in refusing to protect
federalism, the Court "worked a revolution in the relationship of the federal government
to the state governments and to the people" and that the "New Court decisions made con-
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derstanding implies is that the constitutional transformation of
the New Deal era should be conceived of as a revolution from the
perspective of federalism. In granting extensive new powers to
Congress, the New Deal Court engineered a massive project of
constitutional centralization involving a fundamental shift in the
relationship between the states and the federal government. Spe-
cifically, the expanded powers of Congress under the Commerce
Clause, which enabled it to reach "local" activities for the first
time, were transferred from the states, thereby ending (in effect
if not in name) their previously exclusive power over intrastate
matters.' The consequence was that the states became constitu-
tionally dependent on the will of Congress through the latter's
power of preemption and the operation of the Supremacy Clause.'
Arguably, this not only radically changed the nature and balance
of the federal system, but abolished federalism as a matter of
constitutional law.4 What divides supporters and opponents of
the New Deal Court is not the belief that it brought about this
nationalist revolution, but their respective evaluations of its con-
stitutional legitimacy, wisdom, or both.5
gressional power over commerce virtually limitless as the Court simply stopped protect-
ing federalism." Bork, The Tempting of America at 56-57.
2 As Ackerman argues:
Although the enumerated [federal] power strategy was finally repudiated by the
American people, this happened in the twentieth century, not in the eighteenth or
nineteenth, and we are wrong to condemn the Republican Justices for failing to use
the right crystal ball. Though we may properly quibble with the precise way the Jus-
tices drew their lines around interstate commerce, they were not wrong on the main
point; before the New Deal, the People had never self-consciously reallocated plenary
power over the economy from the states to the national government.
Ackerman, We the People at 103 (cited in note 1).
' On the difference between the power of preemption and the principle of the su-
premacy of federal law, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell
L Rev 767, 770-77 (1994).
' Among those who believe the abolition of judicial enforcement of federalism is basi-
cally a good thing, see, for example, Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand
L Rev 1485 (1994). Among those who believe it is not, see, for example, Calabresi, 94
Mich L Rev at 800-06 (cited in note 1).
For an argument challenging the standard assumption that the existence of areas of
exclusive state power is a necessary condition of constitutional federalism, and a proposal
for an alternative model of constitutional federalism based on this argument, see Stephen
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 Tex L Rev 795 (1996).
' See notes 1 and 2. A second, and extremely current, disagreement among'scholars
of the Roosevelt era Court-which cuts across the first one discussed in the text-
concerns the timing of the constitutional revolution. The traditional account dates the
revolution to 1937 and focuses on the "switch in time" of that year when the Court over-
turned its own Commerce Clause and substantive due process decisions of a year earlier.
See, for example, Ackerman, We the People at 49 (cited in note 1); William E. Leuchten-
burg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt
216-36 (Oxford 1995). This received wisdom has recently been challenged by accounts of
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This standard view of the impact of the New Deal period on
the states, however, is a myopic one that seriously distorts our
understanding of the constitutional revolution that the Roosevelt
era Court implemented.' This is so for two reasons. First, it mis-
takenly attributes the character of a zero-sum game to the issue
of the powers of the federal and state governments over the econ-
omy: what the federal government gains in power the states lose.
Although it is most certainly the case that the Court granted the
federal government extensive new constitutional powers during
the New Deal era, it is very far from clear that these powers were
simply transferred from the states as the nationalist account as-
sumes. In many of the most important cases, what the federal
the constitutional revolution that see it as more drawn out and less sudden and discon-
tinuous than the "switch in time" account suggests. See Barry Cushman, A Stream of Le-
gal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine From Swift to Jones & Laughlin,
61 Fordham L Rev 105, 127-31 (1992) (Commerce Clause revolution did not occur until
1941 and 1942); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va L Rev 201, 206
(1994) (challenging the "switch in time" account as a "bedtime story with a happy ending
for New Deal liberals"); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Ex-
periments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U Pa L Rev 1891,
1895 (1994) (transformation starts in 1930 with the appointments of Hughes and Roberts
to the Court).
In addition, both Professors Cushman and Friedman challenge the received explana-
tion for the Court's transformative shifts in constitutional doctrine, viewing them as in-
ternally or legally driven rather than as a response to external political pressures, such
as the 1936 election and the Court-packing plan. See Cushman, 80 Va L Rev at 226
("Because the Court-packing plan lacked sufficient public and congressional support to
pose a genuine threat to the Court as an institution, it is unlikely to have been the
proximate cause of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937."); Friedman, 142 U Pa L Rev at
1897 (constitutional revolution "less affected by immediate political factors" than com-
monly thought). On both these issues of timing and explanation, this Article is largely
agnostic. More importantly for my purposes, Professors Cushman and Friedman do not
deny that there was a constitutional revolution (although Professor Friedman prefers to
call it a "transformation"), nor do they obviously question the generally nationalist char-
acterization of it. For a recent account, however, that does appear to deny there was a
constitutional revolution at all, see Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution For Anyway? Of
History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman, and the New Deal, 46 Case Western Res L Rev 885
(1996) (arguing that "[t]he New Deal called for a significant expansion of federal author-
ity ... but from a constitutional perspective, the increase was quantitative rather than
qualitative.... [The standard account] overlooks] the significant strides toward activist
government that were taken in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."). Id at
921, 929.
6 The hegemony of the nationalist characterization is directly reflected in the stan-
dard terminology for the period. Thus, the terms "New Deal constitutional revolution"
and "New Deal Court" incorporate and express the view that the constitutional revolution
was most essentially about the "New Deal": that is, the constitutionality of the federal
government's legislative program. In challenging this characterization, I generally avoid
these loaded terms and refer to the "constitutional revolution of the New Deal era" and
the "Court during the New Deal era" (or even the "Roosevelt era Court"). For stylistic
reasons, however, I sometimes use the term "New Deal Court" and when this occurs I am
using shorthand for the Court during the entire Roosevelt era (1933-1945) and not only to
that period after the so-called "switch in time" of 1937.
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government was able to do under the Commerce Clause for the
first time as a result of the constitutional revolution, the states
had been unable to do under other pre-revolutionary constitu-
tional doctrines, most notably substantive due process. Accord-
ingly, what occurred in many areas was not a shift from exclu-
sive state authority to concurrent federal and state authority, but
a shift from a regulatory vacuum to concurrent powers: both fed-
eral and state governments were constitutionally enabled to
regulate a large number of areas of social and economic life that
previously they had both been prohibited from regulating. This is
a quite different and more complex transformation, and suggests
that what occurred was much less a nationalist revolution-with
the connotations this label has for its attitude towards state
authority-than it was a revolution in the power and permissible
ends of government at all levels, state as well as national.' In
thus concerning the dynamic issue of enlarging the scope of gov-
ernmental power rather than the more traditional and static one
of its proper distribution among levels of government, the revolu-
tion was unique in constitutional history.8
Second, by focusing almost exclusively on congressional pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, the nationalist account over-
looks the radical changes made by the Court to a whole host of
other constitutional doctrines and, as a result, fails to appreciate
that the states were the direct and sole beneficiaries of much else
that the Court did in this period. While it certainly bestowed ex-
tensive new powers on the federal government under the Com-
merce Clause, the Court also granted many new powers to the
states under various other clauses of the Constitution, especially
as compared with the previous era of constitutional interpreta-
tion.9 Moreover, the net effect of these enhanced state powers
' As I point out in the conclusion, the understanding of what occurred as an
"economic revolution" often exists alongside the nationalist one, although the tension be-
tween the two is generally overlooked due to the common focus on national regulation.
See text accompanying notes 303-04.
' This is not to suggest that the zero-sum perspective is not a useful heuristic tool for
the historical interpretation of previous periods during which national power was en-
hanced, such as the Federalist and Reconstruction eras, see Ackerman, We the People at
58-80 (cited in note 1), but only that it is neither the most useful nor the most accurate
perspective from which to analyze or interpret the constitutional revolution of the New
Deal era.
' One account of the constitutional revolution that does identify some of the areas of
enhanced state power is provided by William E. Leuchtenburg. See The Supreme Court
Reborn at 225-27 (cited in note 5). Even Leuchtenburg, however, does not deal systemati-
cally with state power. His treatment of this side of the story is brief, and is largely inci-
dental (or supplemental) to his account of the increase in national powers. Moreover, he
does not question the standard account of the impact of the constitutional revolution as a
whole on the states and the balance of federalism. For an interesting, critical review of
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was to increase substantially the amount of constitutionally
permissible regulatory diversity throughout the country at the
expense of the uniformity that, as we shall see, was a central
goal of the Lochner era Court and its philosophy of economic na-
tionalism. 0 In this additional, and more subtle way, then, recog-
nition of these changes undermines the nationalist account.
If one isolates and analyzes the history of state power alone
under the Constitution, the net effect of the New Deal era on the
states was to reassert the traditional position that their powers
are presumed to be significantly unconstrained by the Constitu-
tion absent express limitations, a position from which the federal
courts in the previous, Lochner era had radically departed. In
concrete terms, the Roosevelt era Court abolished or significantly
limited a number of specific constitutional constraints on the
power of the states that had either been imposed for the first
time or substantially enhanced during the Lochner era. The im-
position of these constraints had been, in part, a reflection of the
general suspicion of legislative power that characterized much of
the judicial response to Populism and Progressivism, and since
that power was most often and successfully exercised at the state
level, this is where judicial activism was disproportionately felt."
But this is only part of the story, for the Lochner era constraints
on the states also reflected a strong judicial commitment to the
vision of the United States as a truly national economy, pre-
sumptively requiring uniform national, rather than diverse state,
regulation. To promote this vision, the Lochner era Court had re-
structured constitutional federalism in a manner that generally
supported and encouraged the first sustained exercise of congres-
sional power over interstate commerce.' As will be noted
throughout this Article, however, the enhancement of state
power that the New Deal Court ushered in as the result of re-
jecting both of these foundations of the Lochner worldview was
itself partially reversed in subsequent years. During the Warren
Leuchtenburg, see G. Edward White, Courts and Constitution: Cabining the Constitu-
tional History of the New Deal in Time, 94 Mich L Rev 1392 (1996).
0 Unless otherwise specified, by the "Lochner era," I mean to use a familiar short-
hand to refer to the period from roughly the mid-1880s to 1933. This era, of course, takes
its name from the case of Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
" For an excellent and sophisticated version of this by-now relatively familiar view of
the Lochner Court, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873, 874
(1987) (arguing that for the Lochner Court, the Constitution required governmental non-
intervention with the baseline of economic entitlements provided by common law and
market outcomes).
"A masterful and detailed account of this somewhat less familiar story is provided in
Owen Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910 257-92 (Macmillan
1993).
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Court period in particular, many of the Lochner era constitu-
tional constraints on the states were reimposed, albeit for differ-
ent purposes" and in most cases with different wine in the old
bottles, and others-most notably those held to derive from the
Equal Protection Clause-were applied systematically for the
first time. 4
The specific preexisting constitutional constraints on state
power that the Roosevelt era Court lifted or limited are five in
number, and they are discussed at length in the next five sec-
tions of this Article. First, and best-known, the Court abolished
the doctrine of substantive due process that the Lochner era
courts read into the Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, but the burden of which in concrete
terms overwhelmingly fell on the states rather than Congress
(Part II). Substantive due process was the doctrine that the
Lochner era courts had employed more than any other to disem-
"Rather than seeking to counter Progressive legislation and to promote economic na-
tionalism, the purposes of the Warren Court in reimposing many of the constitutional
constraints on the states were (a) to protect privacy, and (b) to combat the "states' rights"
opposition to the Courts equal protection jurisprudence.
" Prior to the Warren Court, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was still largely, as Justice Holmes had stated in 1932, "the usual last resort of con-
stitutional arguments." Buck v Bell, 274 US 200, 208 (1932). Like its predecessors, the
Roosevelt era Court employed the clause infrequently and somewhat inconsistently.
Thus, on the issue of racial discrimination, it gave the NAACP its first victory in a school
desegregation case, Missouri ex rel Gaines v Canada, 305 US 337 (1938), but it also de-
cided Korematsu v United States, the last occasion on which the Court upheld a race-
specific statute disadvantaging a racial minority, 323 US 214 (1944). On equal protection
issues more generally, compare Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942) (invalidating
state statute authorizing sterilization of "habitual" criminals on equal protection
grounds), with Breedlove v Suttles, 302 US 277 (1937) (rejecting equal protection chal-
lenge to state statute requiring payment of poll tax by males between ages of 21 and 60).
For the view that the Hughes Court had a mixed, but overall favorable, record on civil
rights generally, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. and William C. Smith, The Hughes Court
and the Beginning of the End of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 76 Minn L Rev 1099
(1992).
It was of course the Warren Court that breathed life into the clause as a major source
of constitutional rights against the states for the first time. It wielded the clause as its
leading weapon in struggles against racial discrimination and voting/procedural access
rights in particular. See, for example, Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483, 495
(1954) ("separate but equal" doctrine is inapplicable to field of public education because
separate educational facilities are "inherently unequal"); Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 12
(1967) (Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriages violates "the central meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause"); Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 566 (1964) (apportionment
scheme for Alabama legislature violates the Equal Protection Clause that "guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators"); Grif-
fin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 19 (1956) (Equal Protection Clause requires state to provide in-
digent criminal defendant with free trial transcript where necessary for adequate review
of conviction).
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power the states from regulating much of what it prevented the
federal government from regulating under the Commerce Clause.
Second, the dormant Commerce Clause, under which the
states are subject to constitutional limitations on their power to
regulate interstate commerce (even absent congressional action),
had been wielded extremely aggressively against the states dur-
ing the Lochner era but was drastically scaled back by the Court
starting in 1938 (Part HI). Third, where Congress did exercise its
regulatory powers, the Court reduced the impact of such legisla-
tion on state authority by replacing the previously automatic
preemption of state law by federal law in the same field with a
presumption against preemption that is rebutted only when Con-
gress clearly manifests the purpose to preempt (Part V). 5
Fourth, starting in 1937, the Court brought to a virtual halt the
previous trend of applying new parts of the Bill of Rights against
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment (Part V).
Finally, the Court substantially enhanced state judicial
power. The doctrine of Swift v Tyson"6 was overruled in the 1938
case of Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins,' with the result that in di-
versity cases, federal courts apply state law (as interpreted by
state courts) rather than "general federal common law," which
they had previously applied and which Erie abolished. Accord-
ingly, a prominent post-New Deal text could reasonably include
the assertion that [ilt is [state] law which is of chief importance
in the guidance of primary private activity."8 In addition to its
Erie doctrine, the Roosevelt era Court increased state judicial
power by three other means: first, by creating the doctrine of fed-
eral court abstention; second, by expansively reconceptualizing
state court territorial jurisdiction; and third, by substantially re-
ducing the constitutional limitations on state courts' choice of law
(Part VI).'9
"See Gardbaumn, 79 Cornell L Rev at 801-07 (cited in note 3). See also Lawrence Les-
sig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 S Ct Rev 125, 167-68.
41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
17 304 US 64 (1938).
Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 171 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds)
(Foundation 1994).
International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945). A sixth major change
might be thought to involve the Contracts Clause, which prevents states from impairing
the obligations of contracts. In its well known 1934 decision in Home Building & Loan
Association v Blaisdell, 290 US 398 (1934), the Court, over the dissenting votes of Jus-
tices Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter, the so-called four horsemen,
see note 28, upheld against a Contracts Clause challenge a 1933 Minnesota statute de-
claring a state of emergency and temporarily extending the time allowed for redeeming
real property from foreclosure and sale under existing mortgages.
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Contrary to the nationalist account, most of these changes
derived less from considerations of the proper roles of state ver-
sus national legislatures (that is, considerations of federalism)
than from a fundamental change in thinking about the proper
roles of legislatures (whether state or federal) and courts with
respect to matters of public policy. In other words, the constitu-
tional revolution as a whole had more to do with separation of
powers than with federalism, ushering in a new understanding of
the respective legislative and judicial functions. In this regard,
its liberating impact on the states in so many different, but gen-
erally overlooked, doctrinal areas was the result of the fact-
which the nationalist focus on the history of Congress's com-
merce power tends to ignore-that the states had been the pri-
mary victims of the shackles imposed by the Lochner era Court's
judicial activism on behalf of market outcomes and economic na-
tionalism. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that
the states were entirely unintended and indirect beneficiaries of
the Court's new philosophy of judicial restraint and separation of
powers. To the contrary, Roosevelt supporters and appointees
such as Justices Stone, Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter repeat-
edly expressed an affimative and principled commitment to
maintaining and vindicating the role of the states as independent
centers of regulatory power in the new context of expanded,
though largely concurrent, governmental authority. Moreover,
they did not generally see this commitment as inconsistent with
their better known commitments to textualism and judicial re-
straint.20
Although Blaisdell is sometimes viewed as the starting point of the modern approach
that has largely read the Contracts Clause out of the Constitution, see, for example, Sun-
stein, 87 Colum L Rev at 890-91 (cited in note 11), it really only affirmed (perhaps at most
extended) a trend that had started in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Since
the 1905 decision in Manigault v Springs, which held that the Contracts Clause does not
prevent states from impairing the obligations of contracts if the impairment resulted
from an otherwise valid exercise of the police power, 199 US 473, 480-81 (1905), the Court
had rarely invalidated state statutes on this ground. Accordingly, the real issue in Blais-
dell was whether or not the state's police power extends this far, which was a question
concerning substantive due process limitations rather than the Contracts Clause per se.
Indeed, in his dissenting opinion for the four horsemen, Justice Sutherland's list of
precedents supporting his position conspicuously ended in 1896, Blaisdell, 290 US at 470-
71 (Sutherland dissenting), and in relying on their authority, he defended at length the
proposition that the meanings of clauses of the Constitution do not change over time. Id
at 448-71. Accordingly, in my view, unlike the other areas considered in this Article, the
Contracts Clause is not really an area of constitutional law in which the New Deal Court
significantly altered the status quo ante. But see Friedman, 142 U Pa L Rev at 1914-18
(cited in note 5) (arguing that Blaisdell had a significant impact on the Contracts Clause
and was an important harbinger of the new constitutionalism).
' The views of Justice Douglas, unlike those of Justice Black or Justice Frankfurter,
appear to have changed over the course of his long tenure on the Court, perhaps as the
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Taken together and looked at in their own terms, these
changes in doctrine substantially enhanced the constitutional po-
sition of the states as compared with the pre-New Deal era. Al-
though some of them are well known to specialists in the rele-
vant areas, their individual and collective importance in under-
standing the overall constitutional change of the period has
tended to be overlooked in the conventional account's focus on the
Commerce Clause and the battle over the New Deal legislative
program. The claim of this Article is not that state authority can
be precisely quantified and that after all the factors have been
placed on the scale, the states were definitively "better off" in
some global sense after the constitutional revolution than before.
Rather, my claim is that their powers were enhanced in many
important but generally overlooked areas of constitutional law in
a manner and to a degree that complicates the standard and
straightforward nationalist story that is usually told. Even with
respect to the Commerce Clause itself, the impact of (a) substan-
tive due process and the dormant Commerce Clause on the
states' ability to regulate "local" commerce during the Lochner
era, and (b) the qualification of Congress's preemption power
challenges the simple application of the zero-sum framework and
its assumption that federal power was increased at the expense
of the states.21 Once these correctives have been properly taken
into account, it becomes rather more difficult-if not mislead-
ing-to think of what occurred in this era as primarily a nation-
alist revolution in constitutional terms. Moreover, this charac-
terization tends only to obscure what is really at stake in the
continuing battle over the New Deal's legacy. 2
demon of Lochner faded further from view, so that he became a leading proponent of the
Warren Court's jurisprudence. The one area in which a conflict between these two com-
mitments emerged for Justice Black involved his support for the total incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, but even his support for this doctrine was not entirely inconsistent with his
general concern for state authority. See Part V.
" In crude terms, the states were clearly not worse off in those areas they were previ-
ously prohibited from regulating at all. After the constitutional revolution, they could ex-
ercise their concurrent regulatory power until preempted by Congress.
' Indeed, the distracting influence of the nationalist account that is shared by both
supporters and opponents of the Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests
an explanation for Cass Sunstein's observation that, despite the New Deal, what he terms
"Lochner's Legacy"-the fundamental premise that common law and market outcomes
serve as the baseline with respect to which there is a constitutional requirement of gov-
ernment neutrality-has not by any means been extirpated from constitutional interpre-
tation. See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 902-03 (cited in note 11). Arguing over whether
the nationalist revolution was constitutionally legitimate, wise or both is in a sense a
sideshow that diverts attention from the fact that the constitutional revolution was more
fundamentally about the proper scope of governmental power as a whole than about that
of the national government.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The federalism framework of the nationalist account presup-
poses that the extensive new regulatory powers granted to Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause were transferred from the
states. This is why the constitutional revolution of the New Deal
era is characterized as involving a radical transformation in the
relationship between the federal government and the states. In
this Part, I seek to challenge this orthodoxy by showing that
during the reign of substantive due process, the states were also
unable to regulate many of the most important areas that prior
to 1937 were off-limits to Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Accordingly, in these areas the constitutional revolution did not
involve a transfer of (previously exclusive) state powers to the
federal government. Rather, where previously the Court had
purposefully created a regulatory vacuum, there was now con-
current regulatory power.
The story of the rise and fall of substantive due process be-
tween the late 1880s and 1937 is too well known to require de-
tailed retelling here.' Prior to what has become known as the
Lochner era, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments were understood as essentially procedural,
guaranteeing that the federal government (under the Fifth
Amendment) and the states (under the Fourteenth Amendment)
must follow certain "due" procedures before they may constitu-
tionally deprive any person of life, liberty, or property.
In 1886 and 1887, the Supreme Court for the first time an-
nounced the doctrine of substantive due process, meaning that
the liberty sections of the two Due Process Clauses were deemed
to grant certain substantive rights to individuals that limited the
authority of Congress and the states to regulate private-
especially economic-activity.24 The Court relied on this new doc-
trine to invalidate a state statute for the first time in the 1890
case of Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co v Minne-
sota,' and seven years later in Allgeyer v Louisiana it provided a
particularly clear statement of this new constitutional doctrine:
The liberty mentioned [in the Due Process Clause] means
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
In setting out the very brief overview of the general history of substantive due
process contained in this and the following paragraph, I have relied heavily on the excel-
lent account in Geoffirey R Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 81342 (Little, Brown 3d ed
1996).
' The two cases involved were the Railroad Commission Cases, 116 US 307, 331
(1886), and Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623, 661-64 (1887).
134 US 418, 452-59 (1890).
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physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in
all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts
which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above men-
tioned."
In Lochner v New York, the case that gave its name not only
to an era but subsequently to a term connoting illegitimate judi-
cial activism, the Supreme Court in a five-four decision declared
unconstitutional a New York statute that set maximum hours for
bakers on the ground that it impermissibly interfered with the
freedom to contract of both employers and employees that was an
essential part of the liberty of individuals protected by the Due
Process Clause.27 The era of substantive due process lasted until
1937 when the Court, in the landmark case of West Coast Hotel
Co v Parrish and over the dissents of the "four horsemen," dis-
tinguished its own decision of the previous year and overruled
the leading case of Adkins v Children's Hospital, both of which
had held state minimum wage laws for women unconstitu-
tional.28 Since West Coast Hotel, no claim challenging economic
regulation on substantive due process grounds has been enter-
tained by the Court. In 1949, the Court made clear that, in re-
jecting substantive due process, it had returned "to the earlier
constitutional principle that states have power to legislate
against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
165 US 578, 589 (1897).
198 US 45, 64 (1905).
West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379, 388-89, 398-400 (1937), distinguishing
Morehead v Tipaldo, 298 US 587, 618 (1936), and overruling Adkins v Children's Hospi-
tal, 261 US 525, 558, 561-62 (1923). "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse" or "of Reac-
tion" was the pejorative nickname given to the four sternest opponents of the constitu-
tional revolution: Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter.
As both Professors Cushman and Friedman correctly point out, see Cushman, 61
Fordham L Rev at 127-31 (cited in note 5); Friedman, 142 U Pa L Rev at 1919-22 (cited in
note 5), the landmark five-four 1934 decision in Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502 (1934),
which upheld state minimum retail price legislation for milk, marked the beginning of
the end for substantive due process. In Nebbia, the majority overturned the narrow un-
derstanding of the category of businesses ("businesses affected with a public interest")
that could be subject to reasonable regulation in the public welfare. Id at 536-37. None-
theless, ifNebbia was the beginning of the end, the end itself came with West Coast Hotel
in 1937.
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commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run
afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition."29
The two most important points for the general thesis about
the nature of the constitutional revolution of the New Deal era
that I am presenting in this Article are perhaps a little less fa-
miliar than this general story that I have briefly outlined. First,
even though during its reign the courts consistently stated that
substantive due process applied to Congress through -the Fifth
Amendment just as much as it did to the states through the
Fourteenth, the actual impact of the doctrine in terms of invali-
dated statutes was borne overwhelmingly by the states, and cor-
respondingly its demise was of greater direct practical impor-
tance to them than to Congress in terms of enhanced constitu-
tional powers. ° During the Lochner era, over two hundred state
statutes regulating "local" economic activity were declared un-
constitutional under the Due Process Clause by the Supreme
Court alone, mainly in the areas of labor legislation, regulation of
prices, and restrictions on entry into businesses."' This figure, of
course, omits those state statutes struck down by state and other
federal courts following Supreme Court precedent, as well as
statutes never enacted because of their presumed unconstitu-
tionality. By contrast, only a handful of federal statutes were in-
validated directly on due process grounds.2 Accordingly, the de-
mise of substantive due process primarily had the effect of en-
hancing the constitutional powers of the states. Moreover, in the
limited and indirect way that its demise can be thought of as
adding to the powers of Congress,33 it cannot be seen as a
"Lincoln Federal Labor Union v Northwestern Iron & Metal Co, 335 US 525, 536
(1949). On the revival of substantive due process relating to personal rights, see note 71.
"This is not to say that had substantive due process survived, it would not have been
a limitation on the federal government even with its expanded Commerce Clause power.
It is to say that the substantive due process issue was rarely reached given the limita-
tions on Congress's commerce power. Accordingly, Congress was an indirect beneficiary of
its demise.
" See Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 829 (cited in note 23).
"Probably the best known case in which the Lochner era Court struck down a federal
statute on due process grounds is Adair v United States, 208 US 161, 179-80 (1908)
(invalidating federal statute forbidding employers to require employees not to join a un-
ion). But even in Adair, the majority concluded that the federal statute violated the Due
Process Clause only after finding that Congress had exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause. Adkins, it is true, also involved a law passed by Congress. The mini-
mum wage law for women and children struck down in this case, however, was passed by
Congress in its capacity as "state" legislature for the District of Columbia. 261 US at 539.
In the 1935 case of Railroad Retirement Board v Alton RR Co, 295 US 330, 355-62 (1935),
a bare majority of the Court held that the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, as in Adair, the majority also
held that it independently exceeded Congress's commerce power. Id at 362-74.
"See note 30.
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"nationalist!' step because it clearly added to--rather than de-
tracted from-the powers of the states. In this regard, the rejec-
tion of substantive due process can be thought of as an instance
of the positive-sum aspect of the constitutional revolution: it en-
hanced the powers of government per se, state as well as federal.
The second major point connects directly to this latter obser-
vation, and I have already mentioned it above. The impact on the
states of the doctrine of substantive due process was similar in
many important respects to the impact on Congress of the Loch-
ner era's Commerce Clause jurisprudence: to a significant degree,
what Congress was not permitted to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause, the states were very often not permitted to regu-
late either under substantive due process. In this manner, the
majority on the Court employed a one-two tactic to support mar-
ket outcomes and private property rights throughout the era: on
the one hand, Congress could not regulate a great deal of private
economic activity because much of this activity was deemed
"local" and thus outside the reach of its interstate commerce
power; on the other hand, the states could not regulate a good
proportion of this "local" activity either, because of the due proc-
ess limitations on their police power. That the two constitutional
rubrics were employed as counterparts to each other in this way
undermines the nationalist interpretation of the revolution, since
it suggests that the new powers of Congress were not transferred
from the states. Prior to the revolution neither federal nor state
government was constitutionally permitted to regulate a broad
array of what were deemed "local" economic activities; as a result
of the revolution, both levels of government were empowered to
do so.
In fact, it is a remarkable feature of the jurisprudence of the
Court throughout the entire Lochner era that in Commerce
Clause cases, its justification for enforcing limits on congres-
sional power was typically made in terms of federalism-utilizing
the zero-sum rationale and defending the reserved police powers
of the states to regulate the economic activity in question-with
not the slightest suggestion in these opinions that under its sub-
stantive due process analysis, those very same state police pow-
ers were subject to rigorous judicial review in the name of free-
dom of contract and private property rights. Indeed, the particu-
lar justices who most extolled the importance of maintaining and
defending the police powers of the states in the Commerce Clause
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context were typically the same justices who took the least ex-
pansive view of these powers under due process review. 4
The proposition that much of what the New Deal Court per-
mitted the federal government to do under the Commerce Clause,
the states had been prohibited from doing under the Due Process
Clause during the Lochner era-so that (contrary to the zero-sum
framework) the increase in federal power cannot simply and
straightforwardly be seen as involving a transfer of power from
the states-is most clearly illustrated in the context of labor
regulation. Indeed, a very large proportion of the best known and
most important cases of both the Lochner and New Deal periods
concerned attempts by either Congress or the state legislatures
to regulate the terms and conditions of employment." In this
area (as in others), both federal and state governments were
subject to extensive constitutional limitations prior to the revolu-
tion; after it, both federal and state governments were freed from
these limitations. Once again, in light of this feature of the New
Deal period's overall impact on constitutionalism, it does not ap-
pear to be particularly accurate or useful to think of what oc-
curred as a nationalist revolution.
Lest it be thought that I am overstating my case with re-
spect to the states in this section, the following is an important
point of clarification. It is certainly true that the Court's deci-
sions interpreting the legislative constraints imposed by substan-
tive due process were uneven throughout the Lochner period and
often hard to reconcile with each other; indeed, overall more
"As we shall see, all four horsemen dissented in both NLRB v Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 76-103 (1937) (objecting to permissive reading of Commerce
Clause), and West Coast Hotel, 300 US at 400-14 (objecting to permissive view of state
police powers).
"In the case of congressional statutes, leading pre-revolutionary cases finding labor
regulations unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause included Hammer v Dagenhart,
247 US 251, 276-77 (1918) (invalidating the Federal Child Labor Act of 1916), Schechter
Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 550-51 (1935) (invalidating the labor provi-
sions of the Live Poultry Code promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933), and Carter v Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238, 309 (1936) (invalidating the labor provi-
sions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935). Leading revolutionary Commerce
Clause cases included Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 49 (upholding the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935) and United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 125-26 (1941) (upholding
the universal minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938). As for decisions finding state regulations of labor conditions unconsti-
tutional under the Due Process Clause, in addition to Lochner itself, leading pre-
revolutionary cases included Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating state
statute banning "yellow dog" contracts) and the progeny of Adkins v Children's Hospital,
261 US at 554: invalidating minimum wage standards for women in Arkansas, Donham v
West-Nelson Manufacturing Co, 273 US 657 (1927); Arizona, Murphy v Sardell, 269 US
530 (1925); and New York, Tipaldo, 298 US 587. The leading revolutionary case involving
state regulation of labor conditions was West Coast Hotel, already mentioned.
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state regulations were upheld than invalidated." Moreover, as
far as labor regulation specifically is concerned, during the Loch-
ner era as a whole the Court on balance probably exhibited de-
creasing vigor in its review as time went by, in certain areas
carving out an increasing number of exceptions to the more ab-
solute positions it had taken earlier. Thus, by the time Roosevelt
assumed the Presidency in 1933, the Court had, despite Lochner
itself and the uncompromising language in Adair v United
States37 and Coppage v Kansas," upheld various state maximum
hours legislation for specific categories of both male and female
employees.39 Nonetheless, a bare majority of the Court claimed
that in doing so it was still applying the original Lochner princi-
ple that distinguished between regulation of specific industries
detrimental to health on the one hand and pure labor laws on the
other, with the consequence that no general maximum hours law
applying to all occupations could be upheld.40 In addition, the
majority continued until the bitter end to hold the original line
against minimum wage laws for both men and women, and also
against legislation granting the right of collective bargaining.4'
Moreover, in other important areas of substantive due proc-
ess, no clear and obvious trend towards decreasing the level of
review of state regulation can be detected over time.42 Thus, for
example, the Court took what was, if anything, a more rigorous
stance towards state price-fixing and business-entry restrictions
in the late 1920s than it had before.' Finally, and perhaps most
See Kramer, 46 Case Western Res L Rev at 925 (cited in note 5).
208 US 161, 174-75 (1908) ("In all such particulars [sale or purchase of labor, quit-
ting, or firing for any reason] the employer and the employ6 have equality of right, and
any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land-"). See note 32.
236 US 1 (1915).
See, for example, Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412, 416, 421-23 (1908) (women "in any
mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry"); Bunting v Oregon, 243 US 426, 438-39
(1917) (factory workers of bath sexes).
Indeed, this distinction had been applied to uphold a state maximum hours statute
for male coal miners prior to Lochner itself in Holden v Hardy, 169 US 366, 393-96 (1898),
and was the principle invoked in Lochner. 198 US at 59-60. The closest the Court came to
upholding a general maximum hours statute was Bunting, 243 US at 438-39 (upholding
maximum hour law for factory workers), although in Adkins, the majority argued that
what justified the outcome in Bunting was that factories were particularly detrimental to
workers' health. Adkins, 261 US at 550-51.
"See text accompanying notes 50-51.
See Kramer, 46 Case Western Res L Rev at 917 n 81 (cited in note 5) ("After 1918,
the Court became considerably more aggressive and less progressive, striking down many
more statutes on due process grounds than before.").
See, for example, Williams v Standard Oil Co, 278 US 235, 240 (1929) (invalidating
state law regulating price of gasoline); Ribnik v McBride, 277 US 350, 356-57 (1928)
(striking down state law fixing prices charged by employment agencies); Tyson and
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importantly, the Court's record concerning the constraints on
federal legislative power over economic activity under the Com-
merce Clause was at least equally uneven and hard to reconcile
throughout the Lochner era, with more federal statutes being
upheld than invalidated." As with substantive due process, the
Commerce Clause cases often produced a bitterly divided Court,
with each side producing long lists of precedents in its favor and
engaging those that were not to show that they constituted de-
partures from the application of true principles long established
by the Court.4" Accordingly, if it cannot be said that with the
death of substantive due process, the Court granted to the states
powers that were entirely unprecedented and unthinkable during
the previous era, the same is true with respect to the new powers
that it granted to Congress. The major difference in both cases
was not so much the individual outcomes upholding particular
exercises of power, but rather the absolute rejection of the old
challenges to those exercises and the constitutional tests that
had been developed around them.
To illustrate the pre- and post-revolutionary constitutional
powers of both Congress and state legislatures with respect to
the regulation of the terms and conditions of employment, I shall
focus on the four well known cases that exhibit the comparison in
the starkest possible terms: the 1936 cases of Carter v Carter
Coal' and Morehead v New York ex rel Tipaldo,47 which show the
limitations on Congress and the states respectively, and the two
"switch in time" cases of the following year, NLRB v Jones &
Laughlin Steel' and West Coast Hotel, which effectively abol-
ished the limitations on both.49
Brother v Banton, 273 US 418, 442 (1927) (invalidating state law setting prices of theater
tickets); New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 278-79 (1932) (invalidating state law
prohibiting any person from manufacturing ice without obtaining required license); Louis
K Liggett Co v Baldridge, 278 US 105, 113-14 (1928) (invalidating state law restricting
entry into pharmacy business).
" See Kramer, 46 Case Western Res L Rev at 921-30 (cited in note 5). Indeed, this
fact leads Kramer to suggest that the 1935-36 decisions overturning New Deal legislation
were more exceptional and inconsistent with prior precedent than those subsequently
upholding it so that they represented a new (if short-lived) departure for the Court.
See, for example, Champion v Ames, 188 US 321, 363-64 (1903) (five-four vote up-
holding the Federal Lottery Act of 1895); Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 US at 276-77 (five-
four vote invalidating the Federal Child Labor Act of 1916). See also Justice Harlan's im-
passioned dissent in United States v E.C. Knight Co, 156 US 1, 18-46 (1895) (dissenting
from majority holding that the Constitution does not permit Congress to regulate
"manufacturing").
,6 298 US 238 (1936).
"298 US 537 (1936).
"301 US 1 (1937).
,To the extent I suggest here (and elsewhere throughout this Article) that the year
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In Carter Coal, decided on May 18, 1936, the Court invali-
dated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, finding
that its labor provisions were unconstitutional because they ex-
ceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. These
provisions, contained in Section 4 of the Act, included establish-
ment of a system of local coal boards that would administer a
code recognizing the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively and also mandated that once a sufficient number of
collective bargaining agreements had been negotiated, their wage
and hours terms would bind all mine operators in the area.0 The
majority opinion did not reach the constitutionality of the sepa-
rately challenged provision of the Act by which the boards set
minimum prices for coal as it held the two sets of provisions not
to be severable.5
Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland first set out the
fundamental principles of federalism requiring the Court to en-
sure that Congress stayed within its specifically enumerated
powers. In doing so, he gave classic expression to the zero-sum
view of federal and state powers that lies behind the under-
standing of what occurred during the New Deal period-by its
supporters and opponents alike-as a nationalist revolution:
And since every addition to the national legislative power to
some extent detracts from or invades the power of the
states, it is of vital moment that, in order to preserve the
fixed balance intended by the Constitution, the powers of the
general government be not so extended as to embrace any
not within the express terms of the several grants or the im-
plications necessarily to be drawn therefrom.52
Sutherland then applied these general principles to the particu-
lar federal statute in question as follows:
Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the
struggle between employers and employees over the matter
of wages, working conditions, the right of collective bar-
1937 was a watershed for state and federal regulatory power under both the Commerce
and Due Process Clauses, I do not intend to take a position in the debate between those
who argue that the entire constitutional revolution of the era occurred in this year and
those who argue that it was more continuous, extending over the entire New Deal period.
See note 5. For one thing, those participating in this debate generally focus on these two
clauses alone, overlooking the other important changes in constitutional doctrine en-
hancing state power that I identify in this Article, many of which took place in other
years.
298 US at 281-84.
Id at 312-17.
Id at 294-95.
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gaining, etc., and the resulting strikes, curtailment and ir-
regularity of production and effect on prices; and it is in-
sisted that interstate commerce is greatly affected thereby.
But... the conclusive answer is that the evils are all local
evils over which the federal government has no legislative
control. The relation of employer and employee is a local re-
lation.53
Two weeks later, in Tipaldo, the Court provoked great furor
throughout the country when it followed its 1923 Adkins prece-
dent and invalidated a 1933 New York statute prescribing mini-
mum wages for women employees on the basis that it violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54 In a
rare public comment on a Court decision, President Roosevelt
said of Tipaldo," it seems to be fairly clear, as a result of this de-
cision and former decisions.., that the 'no-man's-land' where no
Government-State or Federal-can function is being more
clearly defined. A state cannot do it [set a minimum wage], and
the Federal Government cannot do it."55 Although Justice Butler
stressed in his five-four opinion for the Court that the petition
had not requested that Adkins be reconsidered on the merits but
merely that the New York statute be distinguished from the one
held unconstitutional in that case, he appeared to leave little
doubt that this procedural point would not have affected the out-
come, at least as far as he was concerned.56 Referring to two
other post-Adkins cases in which the Court had been asked to
overrule its precedent, Butler stated that in each of these cases,
the Court was "clearly of opinion that no discussion was required
to show that, having regard to the principles applied in the
Adkins case, the state legislation fixing wages for women was re-
pugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."57 He summarized these principles as follows:
In making contracts of employment, generally speaking, the
parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best
Id at 308 (second emphasis added).
" 298 US at 609. For some of the details of the furor, see Leuchtenburg, The Supreme
Court Reborn at 215 (cited in note 5). The 1936 Republican presidential platform pledged
to introduce a constitutional amendment to overrule Tipaldo.
Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 106 (cited in note 5), citing Samuel I.
Roseman, ed, 5 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 191-92 (Russell
& Russell 1969).
Tipaldo, 298 US at 604, 618. For the argument that this procedural point deter-
mined the vote of Justice Roberts, see Friedman, 142 U Pa L Rev at 1940-46 (cited in note
5).
, Tipaldo, 298 US at 618. The two earlier cases were Donham, 273 US 657, and Mur-
phy, 269 US 530. See note 35.
[64:483
New Deal Constitutionalism
terms they can by private bargaining. Legislative abridge-
ment of that freedom can only be justified by the existence of
exceptional circumstances. Freedom of contract is the gen-
eral rule and restraint the exception.
Butler concluded that "[t]he decision [in Adkins] and the rea-
soning upon which it rests clearly show that the State is without
power by any form of legislation to prohibit, change or nullify
contracts between employers and adult women workers as to the
amount of wages to be paid.""8 Nowhere in his opinion did Justice
Butler mention that "the relation of employer and employee is a
local relation" in the federalism sense insisted upon in Carter
Coal. Moreover, if a state was without power to regulate the
wages of ordinary women employees, it was certainly without
power to regulate those of ordinary men.
Let us now turn the clock forward just nine months to March
29, 1937, a presidential campaign and Court-packing plan later,
but with no changes of personnel on the Court.59 In West Coast
Hotel, by a five-four decision and with Justice Roberts's vote
alone differing from those cast in Tipaldo,4' the Court expressly
overruled Adkins and upheld the State of Washington's mini-
mum wage law for women as a reasonable exercise of the state's
"broad protective power."5 ' Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion
for the Court wrote that:
the liberty safeguarded [by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment governing the states] is liberty in a
social organization which requires the protection of law
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals
and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is
thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and
is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.
Tipaldo, 298 US at 610-11.
' The first change occurred when Justice Van Devanter retired on June 2, 1937,
nearly two months after the decision in Jones & Laughlin. He was replaced by Justice
Hugo Black.
"Contrary to the "switch in time" thesis, I do not intend to suggest any causal con-
nection between Justice Roberts's vote and the Court-packing plan. As Professor Fried-
man has convincingly shown, Roberts voted to uphold the Washington minimum wage
law at the first conference on the case following oral argument on December 19, 1936,
over six weeks before the Court-packing plan was announced. See Friedman, 142 U Pa L
Rev at 1949-50 (cited in note 5).
'- West Coast Hotel, 300 US at 396.
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This essential limitation of liberty in general governs free-
dom of contract in particular.6 2
The majority concluded that upholding the statute was a
"true application of the principles governing the regulation by the
State of the relation of employer and employed," and that Adkins
had been a "departure."63 Hughes described these principles as
follows:
In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the
legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order
that there may be suitable protection of health and safety,
and that peace and good order may be promoted through
regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions of work
and freedom from oppression.'
The majority applied these principles to the effect that the public
interest in the health of women and their protection from un-
scrupulous and overreaching employers was both clear and well-
established and that, contrary to the opinion of the dissenters, no
constitutional difference exists between the regulation of maxi-
mum hours and the fixing of a minimum wage as an acceptable
means to that permissible end. Both are within the legislative
discretion of the states.65
Writing for all four horsemen in dissent, Justice Sutherland
insisted that Adkins was properly decided and should stand. He
stated that its principle of freedom of contract as the general rule
and restraint the exception, justified only by the existence of ex-
ceptional circumstances, was unquestioned, and that the distinc-
tion between fixing hours (which is merely an incident of em-
ployment) and fixing wages remained essential. 6 To the extent
that the minimum wage exceeds the fair value of the services
rendered, this amounts to a compulsory exaction from the em-
ployer and is a "naked, arbitrary exercise of power" contrary to
due process." It is similarly so because in singling out women
alone, the statute denies them the right to compete freely with
men for work paying lower wages than the minimum."
The gap between the majority's "wide" legislative discretion
to interfere with freedom of contract in the public interest and
2Id at 391-92.
Id at 397.
Id at 393 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
Id at 398-99.
Id at 406-08 (Sutherland dissenting).
Id at 411, quoting from Adkins, 261 US at 559.
West Coast Hotel, 300 US at 411-13 (Sutherland dissenting).
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the dissent's strong presumption against such interference was
clearly enormous. Although the majority did not take this par-
ticular occasion to spell out the general implications of the gap, it
did so for all intents and purposes in United States v Carolene
Products Co a year later by announcing its general deference to,
and the presumptive constitutionality under the Due Process
Clause of, legislative judgments in matters of economic regula-
tion.69 The official and explicit rejection of substantive due proc-
ess came in the 1941 case of Olsen v Nebraska, in which Justice
Douglas referred to the doctrine as:
those notions of public policy embedded in earlier decisions
of this Court but which, as Mr. Justice Holmes long admon-
ished, should not be read into the Constitution.... Since
they do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot
give them continuing vitality as standards by which the con-
stitutionality of the economic and social programs of the
states is to be determined. 0
This complete and definitive rejection of substantive due process
lasted until 1965 when, in Griswold v Connecticut, the Court re-
vived and reaffirmed that part of the doctrine concerning per-
sonal rights and the right of privacy in particular.'
304 US 144, 152 (1938).
313 US 236, 247 (1941) (internal citation omitted).
" 381 US 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute pro-
hibiting the use of contraceptives on the ground that it violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the liberty section of which includes a "zone of privacy cre-
ated by several fimdamental constitutional guarantees [contained in the Bill of Rights to-
gether with the penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees]." Id at 485.
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas stated that it continued to reject Lochner as ap-
plied to "economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions," but that as regards
the "intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that
relation," it "renfflrm[s] the principle of Pierce [v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925)]
and the Meyer [v Nebraska, 260 US 390 (1923)] cases." Griswold, 381 US at 482-83. The
principle of these two Lochner era cases was that the Due Process Clause requires the
state to respect "certain fundamental rights," Meyer, 260 US at 401, possessed by each
individual, including the right to contract, to choose an occupation, to establish a home
and bring up children, and to freely worship God, that have been "long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id at 399. See
text accompanying notes 215-16.
In dissent, Justice Black argued that to find a right of privacy in the "penumbras7 of
the first eight amendments was simply to engage in the "same natural law due process
philosophy found in [Lochner] ... [and] which many later opinions repudiated." Griswold,
381 US at 515-16 (Black dissenting). Moreover, according to Justice Black, this "formula
... is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's views about personal rights
than those about economic rights." Id at 522.
Griswold's right of privacy was, of course, extended in subsequent landmark cases to
protect all "individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by
the State," Carey v Population Services Intl, 431 US 678, 687 (1977), including the right of
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Jones & Laughlin, decided two weeks after West Coast Hotel
and with the same alignment of votes, upheld the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 as within the power of Congress on the ba-
sis that the "unfair labor practices" it prohibited (namely, re-
straint or coercion of employees' ability to organize and bargain
collectively) directly and immediately burdened interstate com-
merce. 2 Thus, contrary to the very recent decisions in Schechter
Poultry and Carter Coal, a bare majority of the same Court now
upheld the power of Congress to regulate the terms and condi-
tions of employment in manufacturing.73
Justice McReynolds's dissenting opinion for the four horse-
men is particularly interesting from the perspective of whether
the congressional power now affirmed by the majority was a
power that was exercisable by the states prior to West Coast Ho-
tel. It is interesting because the inherent and underlying tension
between the strategy of opposing congressional power in the
name of the reserved powers of the states and the dissenters'
deeper and more fundamental convictions in favor of liberty of
contract and the rights of property comes to the surface. Pre-
dictably, McReynolds began his dissenting opinion by relying on
Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal for the principle that had been
applied in those cases to invalidate the respective federal stat-
utes: "the power of Congress ... does not extend to relations be-
tween employers and their employees engaged in manufacture."74
As we saw in Carter Coal, such relations are local matters be-
yond the power of Congress. 5 But unlike his colleague in Carter
Coal who had left the (presumably unwelcome) conclusion that
such relations are therefore within the police power of the states
somewhat implicit, McReynolds bit the bullet and followed the
lower court, whose entire opinion he incorporated as Part H of
his own, by making this implication explicit. According to
McReynolds:
Any effect on interstate commerce by the discharge of em-
ployees shown here [for union activities, which was a pro-
hibited "unfair practice" under the Act], would be indirect
and remote in the highest degree.... A more remote and in-
direct interference with interstate commerce or a more deft-
all persons (and not just married couples) to use and have access to contraceptives, Eisen-
stadt v Baird, 405 US 438, 454-55 (1972), and most famously of all, a woman's right to an
abortion, Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 164-65 (1973).
Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 41-43.
7 Id at 34-41. See also note 35.
"Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 76 (McReynolds dissenting).
See text accompanying note 53.
504 [64:483
New Deal Constitutionalism
nite invasion of the powers reserved to the states is difficult, if
not impossible to imagine.... The Constitution still recog-
nizes the existence of states with indestructible powers; the
Tenth Amendment was supposed to put them beyond con-
troversy.
7 6
This impassioned defense of state regulatory authority from
the four justices, who so vigorously argued against state power to
regulate wages just two weeks earlier by invoking the near-
absolute freedom of contract language of Adkins, may strike one
as surprising and disingenuous. The inherent tension between
concern for state regulatory authority and freedom of contract is,
however, resolved by Justice McReynolds himself in favor of the
latter, for at the very end of his opinion in Jones & Laughlin, he
relies directly on Adair and Coppage, two of the major substan-
tive due process decisions which deny the power of interfering
with the choice of contractual partners in the labor context to any
government, federal or state. Quoting Adair, McReynolds writes
that, "[Ilt is not within the functions of government... to compel
any person in the course of his business and against his will to
accept or retain the personal services of another." And he contin-
ues, "Coppage v Kansas, following the Adair case, held that a
state statute, declaring it a misdemeanor to require an employee
to agree not to become a member of a labor organization... was
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
77
Thus, as far as the four dissenters were concerned, it seems
clear that their deepest conviction was that neither Congress nor
the states could constitutionally do what the majority in Jones &
Laughlin permitted Congress to do. And, moreover, neither Con-
gress nor the states could do what the majority permitted the
states to do in West Coast Hotel. Or, to take two other landmark
examples: is it likely that prior to 1937 the states would have
been permitted under substantive due process to do what a
unanimous, newly constituted Court permitted Congress to do in
either United States v Darby" in 1941 (to set universal minimum
wage and maximum hour laws) or Wickard v Filburn79 in 1942
(to regulate the production of wheat for purely domestic con-
" Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 96-97 (McReynolds dissenting) (emphasis added).
"Id at 102-03, quoting, in part, from Adair, 208 US at 161.
312 US 100, 125-26 (1941). Justice Stone's famous statement in Darby that "[tihe
[Tenth] [Almendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered," id at 124, is not a nationalist manifesto. It simply affirms that the Tenth Amend-
ment expressly sets out the principle of enumerated federal powers.
317 US 111, 128-29 (1942).
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sumption)? In their heart of hearts, the four horsemen were
against government regulation of "private" economic relations by
any level of government, rather than pro-states' rights, just as
their colleagues in the majority were for permitting reasonable
economic regulation per se rather than specifically being for
regulation at the national level.
In sum, considering the impact of substantive due process
alongside the conventional focus on the Commerce Clause per-
mits us to see that, contrary to the straightforward nationalist
account, the net result of the Court's leading decisions in both
areas was far less a massive transfer of powers from the states to
the federal government than a shift from a regulatory vacuum to
concurrent powers. This section has, accordingly, addressed the
first reason stated in the introduction for thinking that the na-
tionalist account distorts our understanding of the constitutional
revolution as a whole. In the remainder of this Article, I focus on
the second reason and describe what in this context are the
largely overlooked changes in many other constitutional doc-
trines that directly and solely benefited the states.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A second radical change in doctrine undertaken by the New
Deal Court that reduced the previously established constitutional
limitations on state regulatory power concerned the "dormant"
Commerce Clause. This area of constitutional law deals with a
fundamental economic issue that confronts all federal systems:
namely, whether (constitutionally speaking) the entire territory
within that federal system is to constitute a single-or common-
market, or whether it is effectively to be divided into a series of
separate markets that result from the economic impact of diverse
regulatory regimes in the individual states. In other words,
should the inevitable conflict between the general economic bene-
fits of a single market on the one hand, and the capacity of the
constituent states to exercise their traditional regulatory powers
on the other, be resolved in favor of a constitutional norm of free,
unrestricted movement of goods across state boundaries?0
For example, in the European Union, the establishment of a common market
among the member states is a fundamental principle. See Treaty of Rome, Article 2. The
specific provisions constitutionalizing free movement of goods throughout the Union are
contained in three different sections of the Treaty of Rome: Articles 9-17 (prohibiting cus-
toms duties and measures having equivalent effect), Articles 30-37 (prohibiting quantita-
tive restrictions and measures having equivalent effect), and Article 95 (prohibiting dis-
criminatory internal taxation).
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As things have developed in the United States, this funda-
mental constitutional issue is framed in terms of the negative
implications (if any) of the constitutional grant to Congress of the
power to regulate interstate commerce." Does this grant have
any constitutional implications for the regulatory or "police"
powers of the states when an otherwise valid exercise of those
powers has an impact on commerce crossing state lines? Put yet
another way, is congressional power to regulate interstate com-
merce exclusive of the states or is it concurrent, with state power
subject only to the impact of enacted federal law through the Su-
premacy Clause and Congress's power of preemption? To the ex-
tent that the former is the case, what types of state regulation
constitute a regulation of interstate commerce?
For the first sixty years of its history, the Supreme Court
gave no clear and authoritative answer to this question. To be
sure, certain dicta of Chief Justice Marshall expressed clear sup-
port for exclusivity and the vision of a single market,82 but his
successor, Chief Justice Roger Taney, vigorously asserted the
contrary position: namely, that the Commerce Clause in itself
has no negative implications for state sovereignty.' In its land-
mark 1851 decision in Cooley v Board of Wardens, the Court fi-
nally gave an authoritative determination, although it opted for
the compromise position of what became known as "selective ex-
clusivity." It held that no single answer could be given that would
cover all the myriad subjects contained within the grant of power
over commerce and divided these subjects into two categories:
"I The text of the Constitution could arguably have permitted this issue to be framed
in different terms, for example, through the Imports Clause, but this clause was held not
to apply to domestic imports. See text accompanying note 110.
"Most notably in Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 209 (1824) ("There is great
force in this argument."), and Brown v Maryland, 25 US (12 'Wheat) 419, 449 (1827).
"See The License Cases, 46 US (5 How) 504, 578 (1847) (Taney opinion) ("[Tuhe mere
grant of power to the general government cannot, upon any just principles of construc-
tion, be construed to be an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any power over the
same subject by the States.... [State] regulations [of commerce] are valid unless they
come in conflict with a law of Congress.").
Among current members of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia essentially afrms the
Taney position as a textual and historical matter. See, for example, Tyler Pipe Industries,
Inc v Washington State Department of Revenue, 483 US 232, 263 (1987) ('The historical
record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it
says-an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce."). Among contemporary con-
stitutional scholars, Taney's position is held by Martin H. Redish, also on textual
grounds. See Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause
and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 Duke L J 569, 573 ("State power to
regulate interstate commerce was designed to be determined solely by the political judg-
ment of Congress."). Professor Richard Friedman has also advocated abandoning the doc-
trine. See Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of its Misery, 12
Cardozo L Rev 1745, 1745 (1991).
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first, those that are "inherently national" because they require
uniform regulation throughout the country, with respect to which
congressional power is exclusive; second, those that are "local" in
that they are likely to benefit from more diverse and contextual-
ized treatment, with respect to which state and federal power is
concurrent.' In effect, the Cooley Court compromised between
the two competing values of a single national market and con-
tinuing state regulatory authority: it affirmed a limited constitu-
tional norm of free movement of goods, applying to some but not
all of the subjects of interstate commerce. As to which of the two
categories a particular subject fell into, the Court was in effect
required to balance the claims of uniformity, diversity, and state
sovereignty in each case. Although for the first thirty years of its
existence the decision in Cooley was largely ignored, from the
mid-1880s continuing right into the present, it is cited as the
classic precedent on the issue, although it has been used in sup-
port of solutions to the basic conflict that span the entire spec-
trum of possibilities."
The original Cooley solution was decisively shifted in favor of
a broader and more general constitutional norm of free interstate
movement of goods when, starting in the mid-1880s with its deci-
sion in Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway v Illinois,"5 the
Court firmly and consistently embraced the vision of the United
States as a single or common market for the first time. By read-
ing this vision into the Commerce Clause and accordingly ex-
panding the "inherently national" prong of the Cooley test to em-
brace all movement of goods across state lines, the Court sharply
limited the regulatory powers of the states in the name of eco-
nomic nationalism. In the words of (then Professor) Felix Frank-
furter:
53 US (12 How) 299, 319 (1851). Applying this test to the case before it, the Cooley
Court found that the Pennsylvania statute in question, which required ships to utilize a
local pilot when navigating the waters around Philadelphia, was valid as an exercise of
concurrent state power over one of these "local" subjects, even though it undoubtedly
regulated and burdened interstate commerce. Id at 319-21. This result, upholding the
challenged state law, no doubt explains Chief Justice Taney's vote with the majority.
' For classic treatments of the history and development of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, see Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power Versus States Rights
(Princeton 1936); Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney, and
Waite (Quadrangle 1937); Bernard C. Gavit, The Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution (Principia 1932); Thomas Reed Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitu-
tional Interpretation 150, 181-82 (Columbia 1956); F. D. G. Ribble, State and National
Power Over Commerce (Columbia 1937).
118 US 557, 577 (1886) (holding that states lack power to regulate rates of railway
trips extending beyond their borders).
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not until after the Reconstruction period had largely spent
its political energies did those powerful economic forces
emerge which bring into play the aff=iative possibilities of
the authority over commerce granted to Congress, and the
beginning of the long series of restrictions upon [state] leg-
islative interference with economic enterprise which the Su-
preme Court has found in the commerce clause as well as in
the due process clause."
As Frankfurter indicates, these new limitations on the interstate
power of the states were in addition to the limitations that the
same Court imposed on their purely intrastate police power un-
der the rubric of substantive due process considered above. And
once again, as in the area of due process, these limitations under
the Commerce Clause remained largely in effect until the New
Deal era, when the Court rejected the vigorous and activist judi-
cial review on which they were premised. In 1938, the Court an-
nounced that it was drastically scaling back dormant Commerce
Clause review, thereby substantially enhancing the constitu-
tional powers of the states.
This new resolution of the fundamental issue, however, did
not survive fully intact for very long. By 1949 at the latest, and
probably by 1945, a majority of the Court was persuaded to re-
treat from the full radicalism of 1938. Nonetheless, overall the
"modern approach" to the dormant Commerce Clause that was
forged in these years reflects a significantly less nationalist vi-
sion than the predominant one during the Lochner era. Although
there is a good deal of controversy as to how precisely the modern
approach to the clause should be characterized," it is at least
common ground that this approach originated during the New
Deal era and that it differs markedly from what went before.89
Moreover, by focusing on the larger picture and abstracting from
the details and complexities of the modern case law that fuels the
Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause at 8 (cited in note 85).
The main positions in this controversy are (a) to take the Court's balancing test at
face value, see Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
Colum L Rev 1022, 1037-41 (1978); (b) that the Court is in fact applying a nondiscrimina-
tory effect standard that is justified by representation-reinforcement considerations, see
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L J 425, 474-84
(1982); or (c) that the Court is applying a nonprotectionist standard requiring proof of in-
tent to discriminate, see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich L Rev 1091, 1206-07 (1986).
Contemporary scholarly treatments of the dormant Commerce Clause typically do
not consider cases from before the New Deal period. See, for example, Regan, 84 Mich L
Rev at 1093-94 (cited in note 88) (noting that he will "discuss no case from before 1935" in
setting out scope of his thesis); Eule, 91 Yale L J 425 (cited in note 88) (tracing origin of
modern approach to the cases of the 1930s and 1940s).
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controversy, it becomes clear that however the post-1945 ap-
proach is best characterized, it leaves both more constitutional
space for state regulatory activity than did the dominant concep-
tion held between the mid-1880s and 1938, and less constitu-
tional space than the Court carved out for the states between
1938 and 1945.9o
A. The Lochner Era
During the period in which the vision of a single national
market rose to dominance on the Court, from roughly the mid-
1880s to the turn of the century, the conflict between it and the
competing claims of state regulatory authority was most intense
in cases involving state laws regulating the sale of intoxicating
liquors." These laws were enacted as part of the hugely success-
ful and growing prohibitionist movement in the late nineteenth
century, and the Court's opposition to them as clogging the na-
tion's commercial arteries ultimately brought it into confronta-
tion not only with the states but also with the express intent of a
Congress that, under prohibitionist pressure, twice acted to over-
turn the Court's decisions and to bolster state power.9"
For reasons that will be explained below, the Lochner of
dormant Commerce Clause cases was Leisy v Hardin," decided
in 1890-that is, contemporaneously with the first cases invali-
dating state laws on substantive due process grounds. In Leisy,
the Court overruled the leading precedent of The License Cases, a
(pre-Cooley) Taney Court decision of 1847 that had upheld state
liquor licensing laws that applied not only to liquor produced in
the state but also to imports.9 The Iowa statute in question in
Leisy, which had been enacted after the Court's 1888 decision in
Bowman v Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co holding that
states cannot ban imports of liquor, " prohibited sale within the
state of all intoxicating liquors-domestically produced as well as
imports from other states. By a six-three majority, the Court in
' One possible dissenting voice with respect to this point is that of Lisa Heinzerling,
The Commercial Constitution, 1995 S Ct Rev 217, 271-75 (arguing that the modem non-
discrimination principle itself is a Lochner-style incursion on the legitimate autonomy of
the states). However, even accepting her argument, one can still distinguish here be-
tween kind and degree.
91 The detailed story of this conflict is masterfully told in Fiss, Troubled Beginnings at
257-92 (cited in note 12).
"See the Wilson Act, 26 Stat 313 (1890), and the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat 699
(1913).
135 US 100 (1890).
See id at 115-18, overruling The License Cases, 46 US (5 How) 504, 585 (1847).
125 US 465, 560 (1888).
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Leisy invalidated this statute on the ground that it was repug-
nant to the Commerce Clause as applied to the sale by an im-
porter of beer produced in another state and still in its original
packages.96 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fuller relied on
an expansive interpretation of the Cooley category of "inherently
national" subjects of interstate commerce (over which Congress
has exclusive power) so that it was held to encompass all inter-
state movement of goods, including liquor.97
Apart from the significance of the actual decision overturn-
ing The Licensing Cases itself, Leisy is generally noted for two
particular features of the majority opinion. First, Fuller adopted
the "original package doctrine" first suggested by Chief Justice
Marshall in 1827-under which goods are still in interstate
commerce even after importation as long as they remain in their
original form or package-to hold that the right to import liquor
(established in Bowman) included the right to sell it in its origi-
nal package, since the process of selling was integral to import-
ing." Second, he expounded on the novel "silence of Congress
doctrine," first mentioned briefly in Bowman, which would per-
mit Congress to authorize otherwise unconstitutional state
regulation even though such intervention would seemingly un-
dermine the uniformity rationale on which exclusive power was
premised in the first place and, to this extent, compromise the
common market vision so clearly reflected in the decision itself.
According to the Chief Justice, given the exclusivity of congres-
sional power over this subject, "so long as Congress does not pass
any law to regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby
indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untram-
meled."99 And, even more invitingly, where a state considers that
sale of particular articles of commerce will be injurious to its citi-
zens, "the responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the regula-
tion of interstate commerce is concerned, to remove the
Leisy, 135 US at 124-25.
According to Justice Fuller, the "transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of
commodities" was an inherently national subject. Id at 109.
' Id at 110-12. Marshall first suggested this doctrine in Brown v Maryland, 25 US (12
Wheat) 419, 441-42 (1827).
Leisy, 135 US at 109-10 (citation omitted). The "silence of Congress" doctrine was
introduced in Bowman, 125 US at 482. It is possible that Chief Justice Fuller thought
that by issuing an invitation that in all probability would not be accepted, the doctrine
might effectively bolster the legitimacy of the Court's activism at little cost to itself given
that (as was still the case until around the turn of the century) congressional silence with
respect to the regulation of interstate commerce was overwhelmingly the rule. If so, his
gamble did not pay off.
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[constitutional] restriction upon the State in dealing with im-
ported articles of trade within its limits."00
Although extending this invitation was arguably inconsis-
tent with full-blooded economic nationalism, there is a third fea-
ture of the opinion which more than any other makes Leisy truly
the Lochner of dormant Commerce Clause cases. In itself, af-
firming that Congress has exclusive power to regulate the inter-
state movement of goods including liquor was certainly impor-
tant enough, but this alone did not answer the additional ques-
tion of when state regulation amounts to a (forbidden) regulation
of the interstate movement of goods. It is specifically in its defini-
tion of the boundary between a valid exercise of the state's police
power over purely intrastate affairs and a prohibited regulation
of interstate commerce that the Court in Leisy comes about as
close to constitutionalizing free movement of goods against the
states as is possible in a federal system. In defining this bound-
ary, Fuller stated that "the law of [a] State amounts essentially
to a regulation of commerce.., among the States... when it in-
hibits, directly or indirectly, the receipt of an imported commodity
or its disposition before it has ceased to become an article of
trade between one State and another."'0 ' And, in summing up the
constitutional infirmities of the state law, he said that the defen-
dants had
the right to import this [Illinois-made] beer into [Iowa] ...
and . . . the right to sell it [there], by which act alone it
would become mingled in the common mass of property
within the State. Up to that point of time, we hold that in
the absence of congressional permission to do so, the State
had no power to interfere by seizure, or any other action, in
prohibition of importation and sale by the foreign or non-
resident importer.... To concede to a State the power to ex-
clude, directly or indirectly, articles [which Congress recog-
nizes as subjects of interstate commerce].., is to concede to
a majority of people of a State . . . the power to regulate
commercial intercourse between the States.
10 2
The three dissenting justices argued that the majority had
mistakenly imputed to the Framers an intention "to subordinate
the protection of the safety, health and morals of the people to
the promotion of trade and commerce."' 3 Rather, they argued, af-
1 Leisy, 135 US at 123-24.
"' Id at 123 (emphasis added).
'"Id at 124-25 (emphasis added).
' Id at 158 (Gray dissenting).
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ter extensively reviewing the previous case law, the Constitution
did not strike such a one-sided balance in favor of free movement
and thereby deprive the states of the power to protect their citi-
zens against the evils of alcohol by even-handedly regulating the
sale of all intoxicating liquors inside the State, both domestically
produced and imported. Moreover, such laws affect interstate
commerce much more remotely and indirectly than many other
state laws of unquestioned validity, such as quarantine laws and
laws authorizing the construction of bridges and dams across
navigable rivers."0 4
In order to fully appreciate (a) just how broad was the Leisy
majority's definition of the constitutional constraints on state
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause; and (b) precisely
why this definition effectively constitutionalized free movement
of goods and a single national market, it will perhaps be useful
briefly to introduce and consider some very basic principles of in-
ternational trade theory."5 There are a number of different levels
or stages of economic integration that states within either a fed-
eral system or an international organization may seek to attain
among themselves. What is known as "a free trade area" involves
the abolition of tariffs and quotas between member states, thus
achieving so-called "national treatment," meaning that there is
equal treatment by member state governments of domestic goods
and goods made in the other member states. A free trade area
does not, however, involve common customs tariffs: as to non-
member states, each member maintains its own independent
tariff policy. A "customs union," by contrast represents one stage
beyond a free trade area toward economic integration among
member states, in that it creates a common tariff policy on goods
imported from non-member states. °"
One stage of economic integration beyond a customs union is
a common or single market, the most important distinguishing
feature of which for our purposes is the existence of a common or
uniform regulatory regime affecting the free flow of goods among
member states. Under either a free trade area or a customs un-
ion, governments are forbidden from directly excluding or re-
l" Id at 157-60.
" See Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration 2 (Compton 1973).
"An important implication of this difference is that once inside the customs union,
all goods (and not only goods made in member states) will be in "free circulation." There
is no longer a need to distinguish between goods from member and non-member states as
there is with a free trade area (typically through complex "rules of origin7) in order to
prevent non-member state goods from entering the lowest-tariff state and moving into
higher-tariff states, thereby undermining the capacity of the states to maintain their in-
dependent tariff policies.
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stricting imports from other member states through the imposi-
tion of monetary or numerical barriers (tariffs or quotas, respec-
tively) on them, but neither system addresses the substantial
barriers to the free flow of goods across state or national borders
that governments create indirectly as the inevitable result of ex-
ercising their general regulatory powers. For example, different
(albeit nondiscriminatory) health and safety regulatory regimes
may be in place in the different member states. If State A re-
quires beer to be made from a specified list of ingredients for
health and consumer protection reasons, and State B specifies a
different list, then beer producers in State B wishing to sell in
both markets will be forced to incur the increased costs of sepa-
rate production lines for each market. The effect of the differen-
tial regulatory regimes is to distort the free competition in State
A between its own beer producers (who do not face this increased
cost) and those of State B and thus to distort or restrict the flow
of imports into State A."°7 Only a common regulatory regime,
which prevents such indirect restriction of imports from taking
place, can ensure the existence of a single or common market-
place.
Putting this very basic excursus into international trade the-
ory back into our context, the fundamental issue is whether the
Constitution itself (that is, in the absence of congressional action)
establishes (a) a common market among the states; (b) a customs
union; (c) a free trade area; or (d) none of the above. It might un-
derstandably be thought that the Constitution expressly creates
at least a customs union since the Imports Clause appears to
prohibit the states from imposing customs duties on goods from
other states or from abroad without congressional consent,"8 and
the Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, including presumably the power
to impose tariffs."° In 1869, however, the Court decided that the
Imports Clause applies only to foreign, and not domestic imports,
with the result that if any such constraint on the states exists it
"These were the essential facts of the well known decision of the European Court of
Justice in the "German beer" case, Commission v Germany. The ECJ held that a 450-
year-old German law requiring that only beer manufactured solely from malted barley,
hops, yeast, and water could be marketed as "Bier" was equivalent to a quantitative re-
striction on imported beer since it at least potentially restricted the free flow of foreign
beer without adequate justification. Case 178/84, [1987] ECR 1227, 1268-72.
'"US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 2 (prohibiting states from "lay[ing] any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing [their] in-
spection Laws" without congressional consent).
'"'US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3 (granting Congress power to "regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States").
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must be found in the interstate Commerce Clause itself."'
Moreover, nothing in the Constitution expressly prohibits states
from imposing quantitative restrictions (quotas) on either domes-
tic or foreign imports."'
It follows from what was said above that a necessary feature
for creating and maintaining a common market in a federal sys-
tem is that state governments are limited in their power to take
measures that have the effect of restricting the flow of imports
per se, since such measures are not uniform and so undermine
the commercial unity of the federation as a whole. By contrast, a
customs union (or a free trade area) is not so restrictive. It pro-
hibits tariffs and quotas between members, and in addition typi-
cally prevents member governments from using their general
regulatory powers for protectionist purposes-that is, to distort
free competition between domestic and competing imported goods
within that state. Given the modern regulatory context, however,
a customs union cannot prevent the separateness of markets in
two different member states; it requires only that within the
market of any particular state, imported goods compete on equal
terms with domestic goods. In short, a customs union mandates
equal treatment within each potentially separate market, but not
a single national market. In pursuance of their legitimate (i.e.,
non-protectionist) governmental ends and functions, states may
take regulatory measures that have the effect of restricting im-
ports as compared with the ex ante situation. What they cannot
do is to take measures that restrict imports disproportionately,
as compared to their effect on domestic goods. By contrast, from
the perspective of the more integrationist goal of achieving or
maintaining a single market, state measures that in effect re-
strict imports are objectionable whether they are direct or indi-
rect, discriminatory or nondiscriminatory. All such measures ar-
tificially distort the free movement and circulation of goods
across the nation as a whole and make state boundaries relevant
for commercial purposes.
"'See Woodruff v Parham, 75 US (8 Wall) 123, 136 (1869). Arguably, Chief Justice
Marshall's dictum in Brown suggests that he found such an implication in the Commerce
Clause: "we suppose the principles laid down in this case [state licensing fee imposed on
importers of foreign goods violates the Imports Clause and conflicts with federal statute
imposing import taxes], to apply equally to importations from a sister State." 25 US at
449. On the other hand, he may have assumed that the Imports Clause applied to domes-
tic imports.
... Although the Constitution does not explicitly deal with quotas, which are essential
to both a free trade area and a customs union, Article I, section 10 does explicitly refer to
the power of the states to pass inspection laws. This may explain why even the Lochner
era Court upheld state quarantine laws against dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
See text accompanying notes 102-04.
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It is from this perspective that the definition of state meas-
ures prohibited by the Commerce Clause established in Leisy
may be seen in its full significance. A state law "amounts essen-
tially to a [prohibited] regulation of commerce.., when it inhib-
its, directly or indirectly, the receipt of an imported commod-
ity."" As the dissenters pointed out, there was no doubt that the
invalidated state statute represented an otherwise valid exercise
of a traditional state governmental function aimed at the health
and moral welfare of the citizens."' It was protectionist in nei-
ther purpose nor effect, since it prohibited the sale of all intoxi-
cating liquors (except under certain specified circumstances) re-
gardless of whether such liquor was imported or domestically
produced. Accordingly, on a customs union understanding of the
dormant Commerce Clause, the statute was unobjectionable. The
statute did, however, unquestionably restrict the flow of im-
ported liquor into Iowa compared to the position ex ante, and to
this extent artificially isolated and separated the Iowa market
from the rest of the nation. From the perspective of creating and
maintaining a single national market, this is what rendered the
statute objectionable and it was for this reason that the majority,
who shared this perspective, held that it was inconsistent with
the Commerce Clause.
This, then, is how the Lochner era Court constitutionalized
free movement of goods: a common or uniform regulatory regime
was necessary to maintain a single national market, and that re-
gime was created by the Constitution when it granted Congress
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. The uniform
regime will be either the nationwide absence of regulation on in-
terstate commerce or the national regulation imposed by Con-
gress. In the words of Justice Bradley, one of the economic un-
ion's most powerful advocates on the Court:
[Ilt may be said, that in the matter of interstate commerce
the United States are but one country, and are and must be
subject to one system of regulations, and not to a multitude
of systems. The doctrine of the freedom of that commerce,
except as regulated by Congress, is so firmly established
that it is unnecessary to enlarge further upon the subject."
"Leisy, 135 US at 123 (emphasis added).
"Id at 128-30 (Gray dissenting). The proposition that under their police power the
states could validly regulate domestic liquor had been established, against a due process
challenge, in Mugler v Kansas two years earlier. 123 US 623, 661-64 (1887).
.. Robbins v Shelby County Taxing District, 120 US 489, 494 (1887) (invalidating state
tax on basis that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all by a state, even though tax
does not discriminate against it).
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In this manner the Lochner era Court read the economic doctrine
of laissez-faire into the Constitution against the states under the
dormant Commerce Clause as well as the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But the national market vision that
underlay it did not require a complete regulatory vacuum so that
the Court did not necessarily apply this economic doctrine
against the federal government. To the contrary, with matters it
considered essential to the construction and efficient running of a
national economy and marketplace, the Lochner era Court was
quite willing to expand congressional regulatory power under the
positive aspect of the Commerce Clause and so reduce that of the
states under the negative."5 On the other hand, armed also with
the weapon of substantive due process to limit state power over
purely internal affairs, the single market vision was not neces-
sarily compromised by denying federal power in areas for which
the Court believed no regulation at all constituted the best form
of uniform national regulation."'
"'If congressional power is exclusive under the positive aspect of the Commerce
Clause, then any expansion in its scope reduces the remaining commerce power of the
states. In other words, the Court's interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause cre-
ated a zero-sum game with respect to state and federal power over commerce.
... Moreover, of those state statutes that were sustained by the Court against dormant
Commerce Clause challenges during the Lochner era, a large number concerned the
regulation of two specific subjects with respect to which there were compelling independ-
ent grounds for affirming concurrent state power. These two subjects-the very two sub-
jects referred to in the dissenting opinion in Leisy-were state inspection and quarantine
laws and state laws authorizing the erection of bridges and dams across navigable rivers.
As to inspection and quarantine laws, an express provision of the Constitution clearly as-
sumes the validity of the former and arguably implies that of the latter. Article I, section
10, clause 2 states that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws." Consequently, it would have been difficult to apply the ex-
clusive power rationale to a subject that the Constitution expressly envisages the states
regulating. As to bridges and dams across navigable rivers, the Court was faced not only
with the precedent of Cooley, which could perhaps be read broadly to suggest that all
regulation concerning navigable rivers is a "local" aspect of interstate commerce and thus
subject to concurrent state and federal power, but also with Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Willson v The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co, which is even more directly on
point. In Willson, the case that introduced the idea (and terminology) of dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, Marshall sustained a state statute authorizing a dam across a
navigable creek flowing into the Delaware River, even though the dam obstructed naviga-
tion of the creek by a vessel sailing under a federal coastal license. Marshall held that the
statute aimed at enhancing health and property values and, as it was neither "repugnant
to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state" nor in conflict with any congres-
sional statute on the subject, was a valid exercise of the state's police power. 27 US (2
Pet) 145, 150-52 (1829). Faced with these two inherited instances of concurrent state
power to "directly" affect interstate commerce, which it would have found difficult either
to justify or to overrule, the Lochner era Court may simply have let them stand as
"exceptions" whose application was limited to their specific subject-matters.
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From the perspective of a single market, it is highly instruc-
tive to compare Leisy's definition of prohibited state laws under
the Commerce Clause with a very famous one given by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice to determine which member state laws
violate the equivalent, but far more specific, provision of Euro-
pean Union "constitutional" law-Article 30 of the Treaty of
Rome."1 7 It is instructive because the latter definition, announced
in the landmark 1974 case of Procureur du Roi v Dassonville,"' is
universally acknowledged as representing the high-water mark
of the European Court of Justice's judicial activism on behalf of
the free movement of goods and the creation of a single market
throughout Europe at the expense of the regulatory authority of
the member states.
Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome provides that "[q]uantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect
shall... be prohibited between Member States." In Dassonville,
the European Court of Justice was asked to interpret the mean-
ing of "measures having equivalent effect" to quantitative restric-
tions. Its answer, which is quoted in virtually every subsequent
Article 30 case, was that "[a]ll trading rules of Member States
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or
potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restric-
tions" and are thus prohibited (unless they come within the lim-
ited exceptions listed in Article 36)."' Applying this test, the
Court held that a 1934 Belgian law requiring imports of spirits to
be accompanied by a certificate of origin issued by the Govern-
ment of the originating country violated Article 30 and the prin-
ciple of the free movement of goods throughout the Community,
since by making the indirect importation of spirits via a third
member state more difficult than direct importation from the
producing state, the law could at least potentially restrict the to-
tal amount of spirits imported." Although by including potential
effects on imports the Dassonville definition goes even further in
the direction of diluting state regulatory authority in favor of a
"'In calling the Treaty of Rome the "Constitution" of the European Union despite the
fact that technically it is an international treaty, I am following what is now a standard
view. For major works tracing the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence that trans-
formed the Treaty into a constitution, see generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 Yale L J 2403 (1991); G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for
Europe, in The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change 177
(Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, eds, 1991).
"Case 8/74, [1974] ECR 837.
Id at 852, 858-59.
"'Id at 861-63.
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single market than the Supreme Court did in Leisy, the critical
parallel of including both direct and indirect effects on imports is
obvious and striking. Moreover, just as we shall see that during
the New Deal era the Supreme Court definitively shifted away
from the constitutionalization of free movement, so too the Euro-
pean Court of Justice has very recently, and presumably in re-
sponse to the enormous criticism of its activist, non-textually-
justified position, begun to reset the balance between the goal of
a single market and state regulatory authority.'"
The result in Leisy was, of course, anathema to the prohibi-
tionist movement and within a few months Congress had ac-
cepted Chief Justice Fuller's invitation to intervene on behalf of
the states by passing the Wilson Act,2 whereby Congress
authorized the states to do what Leisy said they otherwise consti-
tutionally could not: subject imported intoxicating liquor, even if
in original packaging, to the same restrictive state laws as do-
mestically produced liquor. Faced with little choice, the Court
upheld the Wilson Act,' but seven years later it resumed the
fight against the prohibitionists for free movement of goods
across state lines by declaring that the Commerce Clause grants
to all individuals the right to import liquor for their own use so
that Congress could only authorize states to regulate the
"incidental" right of resale.' With the Court's withdrawal of its
invitation to Congress, mail-order sales of liquor to residents of
dry states flourished. Thomas Reed Powell relates an anecdote
about the mailman in Illinois who remarked to a consignee,
"Professor, your box of books is leaking."'
The final chapter of the story before the Eighteenth Amend-
ment closed the book for fourteen years was the Webb-Kenyon
Act of 1913, which challenged the Court-protected right to import
by federally prohibiting the importation of liquor in violation of
state law." In Clark Distilling Co v Western Maryland Railway
Co, the Court reaffirmed the principle of Leisy, that under the
Commerce Clause the interstate movement of intoxicants, like all
other articles of commerce, was free from all state control absent
" See Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1995] 1 CMLR 101, 124-25
(ECJ 1993) (holding that the Dassonville definition no longer applies to member state
laws restricting or prohibiting "certain selling arrangements," which now violate Article
30 only if they have a discriminatory effect on the marketing of imported goods).
'See note 92.
'In re Rahrer, 140 US 545, 562-65 (1891).
'Rhodes v Iowa, 170 US 412, 424 (1898); Vance v W.A. Vandercook Co, 170 US 438,
444-45 (1898).
' Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at 157 (cited in note 85).
"'See note 92.
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congressional authorization, but nonetheless held the Act consti-
tutional, partly on the basis of other recent precedents affirming
what became known as the "federal police power."27 Indeed, the
Leisy principle survived as the governing interpretation of the
Commerce Clause until it became very "distinguished" during the
New Deal era." More generally, despite its ultimate defeat on
the liquor issue by the forces of prohibition, the national market
vision which informed the majority's view of the scope of exclu-
sive congressional power and its broad definition of forbidden
state measures survived right up to the New Deal, even though
its dominance was sometimes temporarily eclipsed and often
challenged by those on the Court and elsewhere with a different
vision of the purpose of the Commerce Clause, the proper judicial
function, or both."
B. The New Deal Era
As we have seen, during the Lochner era the dominant in-
terpretation of the negative implications of the Commerce Clause
was that in the absence of congressional action, the movement of
goods in interstate commerce was free from all state control.
Thus, even where the Due Process Clause permitted the states to
regulate a particular article of commerce (such as liquor) under
its police power,130 that power was limited by the Commerce
Clause to the regulation of purely domestic trade in that good
and did not extend to the regulation of imports of it from other
states. Accordingly, although discrimination against out-of-state
goods was certainly sufficient to constitute a violation of the
Commerce Clause on the part of a state, it was not necessary.
During the period from 1938 to 1945, this strongly national-
ist conception of the Commerce Clause as mandating a common
market was rejected in favor of one that effectively understood
-242 US 311, 320-26 (1917). Among the precedents cited were the Lottery Case, 188
US 321, 363-64 (1903) (Congress can prohibit interstate carriage of lottery tickets.), and
Hoke v United States, 227 US 308, 323 (1913) (upholding Mann Act prohibition of inter-
state white slave trade).
'Technically, the Leisy principle was distinguished in Duckworth v Arkansas, to ap-
ply only to regulations of the use and sale of liquor and not its transportation through a
state. 314 US 390, 393 (1941). In Carter v Virginia, Leisy was cited by Justice Frank-
furter in his concurrence as "still on the books." 321 US 131, 139 (1944) (Frankfurter con-
curring). The Eighteenth Amendment overruled Leisy by granting the states concurrent
power to enforce its provisions, but it was of course repealed in 1933 by the Twenty-first.
Despite the technicality of distinguishing Leisy, it was effectively overruled in Duckworth
and Carter.
'For the contemporary academic contribution to this debate, see the works cited in
note 85.
'See note 113.
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the clause as establishing only a customs union among the
states, so that the only limitation it placed on their sovereignty
was the duty of nondiscrimination against out-of-state goods.
This represented a very significant enhancement of state power.
The early New Dealers on the Court expressly defended this un-
derstanding of the clause as the only one consistent with the
proper exercise of the judicial function and the presumption of
constitutionality that attaches to the social and economic policy
choices of elected legislatures, state or federal. Under their influ-
ence, the Court upheld virtually every state regulation chal-
lenged on Commerce Clause grounds until 1945 when Chief Jus-
tice Stone had a change of heart and introduced the balancing
test of state and national interests that remains the official posi-
tion today. Although even under this balancing test state inter-
ests are significantly more protected than under the common
market position that prioritizes the national interest in unre-
stricted trade, there is good reason to believe this official position
masks an actual practice of adhering to a nondiscrimination
standard. 1 '
The 1938 decision in South Carolina Highway Department v
Barnwell Brothers, Inc..2 is the watershed one in which Justice
Stone announced a radical reconsideration of the Court's dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, expressly pegging the ju-
dicial function under this clause to the substantially reduced one
that it was newly employing for the Due Process Clause, and that
he would officially unveil in his famous footnote two months later
in Carolene Products."' In Barnwell, the Court upheld a South
Carolina statute limiting the weight and width of all motor
trucks using the state's highways against a Commerce Clause
challenge, even though the Court accepted the trial court's find-
ings that the statute resulted in a large amount of interstate
commercial truck traffic being barred from the state.1"
Justice Stone's opinion for the Court contains two important
points that emphatically mark the change in Commerce Clause
analysis, both of which incorporate positions typical of New Deal
constitutionalism. First, contrary to the national market concep-
tion, discrimination against interstate commerce is necessary for
a violation of the Commerce Clause. As Stone states:
"'See Eule, 91 Yale L J at 474-84 (cited in note 88).
303 US 177 (1938).
See 304 US at 152 n 4 (1938).
303 US at 182.
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The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce, whatever its form or
method, and the decisions of this Court have recognized that
there is scope for its like operation when state legislation
nominally of local concern is in point of fact aimed at inter-
state commerce, or by its necessary operation is a means of
gaining a local benefit by throwing the attendant burdens on
those without the state .... It was to end these practices
that the commerce clause was adopted.135
Accordingly, apart from discriminating against interstate com-
merce "under the guise of regulation," the Commerce Clause
permits the states to exercise their otherwise valid police powers
for any purpose, even if in doing so they materially interfere with
interstate commerce: "so long as the state action does not dis-
criminate, the burden [on interstate commerce] is one which the
Constitution permits because it is an inseparable incident of the
exercise of a legislative authority, which, under the Constitution,
has been left to the states." 36
This is clearly a quite different test from the one applied in
Leisy and its progeny, where any state action restricting the in-
terstate movement of goods was unconstitutional. Moreover, in a
far less famous footnote than the one making a similar, if
broader, point two months later, Justice Stone suggests that the
rationale behind the discrimination standard is that "when the
regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally
upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted
on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within
the state."3 7 Such a "representation-reinforcing" conception of
the Commerce Clause is very far removed from that held by the
Court during the Lochner era. Finally, on this point, Stone made
clear that the assumption of the district court below (and of the
Lochner era Court) that Commerce Clause review applies a more
rigorous standard to state regulation of interstate traffic than
does Due Process review to state regulation of purely intrastate
traffic was mistaken: the same test applies in both cases.'38
Second, as to the nature of this common test under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
will presume the constitutionality of the legislative judgment and
Id at 185-86 (citation omitted).
1 Id at 189.
'"Id at 185 n 2.
.. Id at 187.
[64:483
New Deal Constitutionalism
defer to it unless it is without rational basis. The determination
of whether the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by even-
handed state regulation are too great "is a legislative, not a judi-
cial function, to be performed in the light of the Congressional
judgment of what is appropriate regulation of interstate com-
merce, and the extent to which, in that field, state power and lo-
cal interests should be required to yield to the national authority
and interest." Justice Stone continued:
In the absence of such legislation the judicial function, under
the commerce clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment,
stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature in
adopting regulations such as the present has acted within
its province, and whether the means of regulation chosen
are reasonably adapted to the end sought.139
Here, nondiscriminatory regulation of a subject of local concern
meant that the state has "acted within its province." In resolving
the second prong of the test, courts are no more entitled because
interstate commerce is affected to sit as legislatures determining
"fairly debatable questions as to [the legislative judgment's] rea-
sonableness, wisdom and propriety" than they are elsewhere. 40
This is a classic statement of New Deal judicial philosophy.
Barnwell was followed by a period of seven years in which
the Court upheld under the dormant Commerce Clause virtually
every challenged state regulation of goods that it considered." In
'Id at 190 (citation omitted).
" ld at 190-91.
141 I intend to exclude from the scope of this statement two other types of regulation
considered under the dormant Commerce Clause. First, regulation concerning the free
movement of persons (as distinct from goods). In Edwards v California, 314 US 160
(1941), the Court unanimously struck down the California "anti-Okie law" that made it a
criminal offense to knowingly bring a nonresident indigent into the state. Although five
justices held that the statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the other four held
that the right to travel was a national right of citizenship granted by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, considered under the rubric
of the dormant Commerce Clause, the statute at issue in Edwards clearly failed even the
scaled-back test of Barnwell since it patently discriminated against out-of-state indigents.
The second excluded category is state taxation, certain instances of which the Court
continued to invalidate under the dormant Commerce Clause after 1938-often over vig-
orous dissents by the early New Deal justices (especially Justices Black and Douglas).
See, for example, McLeod v J.E. Dilwarth Co, 322 US 327, 330-31 (1944) (invalidating
Arkansas sales tax). In excluding taxation cases from my treatment, I am following tradi-
tion, which considers them separately from ordinary "police power" regulation. See, for
example, Justice Stone's statement inDi Santo v Pennsylvania, 273 US 34, 43 (1927) that
in state tax cases "other considerations may apply." My own justification for this exclu-
sion is that since "misuse" of the power of taxation to protect domestic goods is such a di-
rect and well known danger to the free movement of goods that (even) customs unions
typically place constraints on its exercise, it is again not inconsistent with the post-1938
conception of the dormant Commerce Clause that the Court should have continued to
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Milk Control Board v Eisenberg Farm Products, decided in the
year following Barnwell, the Court, over the dissents of the two
remaining horsemen (Justices McReynolds and Butler), deter-
mined that a Pennsylvania statute setting a minimum price to be
paid to milk producers in the state could constitutionally be ap-
plied to purchases of milk bound for sale out-of-state.' The con-
victed milk dealer argued that the statute unconstitutionally
regulated and burdened interstate commerce in that by raising
the cost of milk to him, it had the same effect as an export
duty.' The precise basis of the Court's decision is a little un-
clear. Justice Roberts's opinion refers to the fact that the effect
on interstate commerce is incidental because only a small frac-
tion of the milk produced in Pennsylvania is shipped out-of-state,
and also distinguishes the measure from the New York statute
invalidated in Baldwin v Seelig five years previously on the
ground that the latter was a protectionist measure equivalent to
a tariff barrier on imports since its sole aim was the converse one
of applying New York's minimum-price law to out-of-state milk
imported into the state.'
To the extent that it was the nonprotectionist aim and effect
of the Pennsylvania statute that justified it to the Court, we can
again see the difference between free movement and nondis-
crimination norms. The Court did not deny the defendant's claim
that the state statute was equivalent to an export duty, but from
the perspective of preventing states from discriminating against
out-of-state goods this was irrelevant. In enacting the statute,
Pennsylvania was electing to discriminate against its own milk
in the New York market in order to ensure minimum prices to its
producers, and this legislative decision does not raise the
"representation-reinforcement" concerns that, according to Jus-
tice Stone's footnote in Barnwell, underlie the nondiscrimination
standard. Pennsylvania milk dealers such as the defendant were
represented in the legislature; they merely lost. But from the
perspective of the national market, state measures restricting
exports violate the principle of free movement of goods across
state lines no less than import restrictions.' This perhaps ex-
carefully review state taxation measures. Barnwell did not abolish the Clause but scaled
it back; in effect, certain types of state regulatory activity (not including taxation) were
excluded from its scope.
' 306 US 346, 352-53 (1939).
' Id at 348.
'"Id at 353, distinguishing Baldwin v Seelig, 294 US 511 (1935).
"This is why, for example, in the European Union restrictions on exports are gener-
ally treated in the same manner as restrictions on imports. See EU Treaty Articles 16
(abolishing customs duties on exports) and 34 (prohibiting quantitative restrictions, or
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plains the dissents of the two surviving horsemen, Justices
McReynolds and Butler, who argued that "the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania properly concluded that under former opinions of
this Court the questioned regulations constituted a burden upon
interstate commerce prohibited by the Federal Constitution."46
This clearly indicates that as far as they were concerned, the
Court was departing from its Commerce Clause precedents.
This curt but restrained critique of the Court's reformulation
and reinterpretation of the Commerce Clause constraints on the
states by its two longest-serving members47 was repeated as to
content, if not as to style, two years later by the Court's newest
member and most fervent advocate of a common market concep-
tion of the Commerce Clause. Justice Robert Jackson, in only his
third month on the Court, unleashed a vehement attack on the
new Commerce Clause philosophy and the resulting trend of ex-
tending state power over interstate commerce in his concurring
opinion in Duckworth v Arkansas, decided in December 1941.'
In Duckworth, the Court upheld under the Commerce Clause an
Arkansas statute that required those transporting intoxicating
liquor through the state to apply for and obtain a permit at the
cost of a nominal fee. Distinguishing the Bowman and Leisy
precedents on the basis that the present scheme of regulation
was narrower and less restrictive in operation since it concerned
transportation of liquor alone and not sale or use, Chief Justice
Stone, in what was perhaps his first foray into the methodology
of balancing state and national interests, held that the statute
did not violate the Commerce Clause because "it does not ... in-
terfere with the free flow of commerce among the states beyond
what is reasonably necessary to protect the local public interest
in preventing unlawful distribution or use of liquor within the
state."49
Jackson concurred in the result but not in the reasoning,
resting his decision on the Twenty-first Amendment, which had
granted the states "a much greater control over interstate liquor
traffic than over commerce in any other commodity," rather than
on what he saw as "an unwise extension of state power over in-
terstate commerce." 5 ° He then launched into a scathing attack on
measures having an equivalent effect, on exports).
"'Eisenberg, 306 US at 354 (McReynolds and Butler dissenting).
"Justice Brandeis, who started sitting on the Court in 1915 in between Justice
McReynolds (1914) and Justice Butler (1922), retired on February 13, 1939, two weeks be-
fore the decision in Eisenberg.
'-314 US 390, 397 (1941) (Jackson concurring).
"'Id at 393-96 (majority opinion).
Id at 397-99 (Jackson concurring).
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the Court's expansive reading of state power under the Com-
merce Clause. "Recently the tendency has been to abandon the
earlier limitations and to sustain more freely such state laws
[affecting interstate business] on the ground that Congress has
power to supersede them with regulation of its own." But, he con-
tinued, "[tihe practical result is that in default of action by us
they [the states] will go on suffocating and retarding and Bal-
kanizing American commerce, trade and industry." A little later
he added, "The Court's present opinion and tendency would allow
the states to establish the restraints and let commerce struggle
for Congressional action to make it free."'5 '
Justice Jackson then proceeded to reject the indivisible phi-
losophy of judicial restraint that was the essential core principle
of the earliest New Dealers on the Court and which underlay the
majority's view that review under the Commerce and Due Proc-
ess Clauses is identical. "If the reaction of this Court against
what many of us have regarded as an excessive judicial interfer-
ence with legislative action is to yield wholesome results, we
must be cautious lest we merely rush to other extremes." It was
one thing to strike down state laws regulating such purely inter-
nal matters as maximum hour and minimum wage laws, but
quite another to protect national commerce from diverse regula-
tory regimes. He continued:
[T]o let each locality conjure up its own dangers and be the
judge of the remedial restraints to be clamped onto inter-
state trade inevitably retards our national economy and
disintegrates our national society. It is the movement and
exchange of goods that sustains living standards, both of
him who produces and of him who consumes. This vital na-
tional interest in free commerce among the states must not
be jeopardized.'52
Accordingly, he rejected the trend of adding to the permissible
state restraints on national commerce.
Justice Jackson was of course reacting not merely to the re-
sults of the Commerce Clause cases since 1938, but also to the
conception of the Clause held and vigorously asserted by three of
the first four Roosevelt appointees, Justices Hugo Black, Felix
Frankfurter, and William 0. Douglas, 5 3 all of whom subscribed
explicitly and firmly to a minimalist view of the judicial role in
. Id at 400-01.
"Id at 401.
'"Justice Stanley Reed was Roosevelt's second appointee to the Court, in 1938, on the
retirement of Justice Sutherland.
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Commerce Clause cases, as elsewhere. These three consistently
held that the Commerce Clause by itself empowers the Court to
strike down only actual and patent discrimination against inter-
state commerce on the part of the states; anything short of this is
a matter of legislative and not judicial policymaking. In doing so,
of course, they categorically rejected the national market concep-
tion that Jackson sought to revive. 4
The strength and depth of Justice Jackson's belief in the vi-
sion of a single national market as expressed in this concurrence,
and even more famously in his opinion for the Court in the 1949
case of H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc v DuMond,55 was unique on the
Court at this time and harks back to the earlier era and its de-
fenders such as Justice Bradley. But Jackson was far from alone
among his contemporaries in identifying and commenting upon
the trend of enhancing state power in Commerce Clause cases.
Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas expressly referred to
and relied on the unbroken line of cases that we have just looked
at in their opinions dissenting from the partial abandonment of
the Barnwell approach that was shortly to occur.'55 Moreover, in
his Judge Stephens Lectures at the University of Kansas School
of Law in 1946, published in book form with the title A Declara-
tion of Legal Faith the following year, sitting Supreme Court
Justice Wiley Rutledge described his view of the recent constitu-
tional history of the positive and negative aspects of the Com-
merce Clause, and the connection between them, as follows:
' while all three justices joined the opinions for the Court upholding state regulatory
power under the Barnwell approach, Black and Douglas dissented vigorously when the
majority departed from this approach in Southern Pacific, and Black and Frankfurter did
likewise in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc v DuMond, 336 US 525 (1949). See text accompanying
notes 173-74.
In Hood, Justice Jackson argued that:
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of
powers necessary to control of the economy ... has as its corollary that the states
are not separable economic units.
The material success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make up this
federal free trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of commerce, but
the established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of pro-
tecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions.
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free ac-
cess to every market in the Nation ....
336 US 525, 537-39 (1949).
See text accompanying notes 173-74.
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The negative pendulum [of the Commerce Clause], like the
positive one, has swung back and forth between the state
and the national poles of power.... At times, especially
when the federal commerce power was by way of being con-
tracted, the prohibitive arc was lengthening. The sum of the
two effects, where they conjoined, was to outlaw the possi-
bility of regulation in broad areas of commerce. But, just as
in recent years the permissive scope for congressional com-
merce action has broadened ... the prohibitive effect of the
clause has been progressively narrowed. The trend has been
toward sustaining state regulation formerly regarded as in-
consistent with Congress' unexercised power over commerce.
To the extent this has occurred, the positive and negative
pendulums have moved more and more in unison, not as
mutually exclusive but as more mutually tolerant."5 7
The result, Justice Rutledge continued, is that "the scope of judi-
cial intervention has been narrowed by the more recent trends,
affecting both the affirmative and the prohibitive workings of the
clause. Greater leeway and deference are given for legislative
judgments, national and state, formally expressed."'
In writing his scathing Duckworth concurrence, which he re-
lied upon again two years later in a case upholding a Virginia
statute that was a more restrictive version of the one in Duck-
worth,' Justice Jackson may have been fighting a battle for the
Commerce Clause soul of now-Chief Justice Stone, 60 who, after
declaring the terms of the general judicial retreat of 1938 in
Carolene Products and Barnwell, appears to have continued the
process of rethinking his position on the Commerce Clause after
assuming his new office. He was perhaps influenced in this proc-
ess by the views of Professor Noel Dowling, with whom he is
known to have corresponded and whose highly influential 1940
article, Interstate Commerce and State Power, argued for a judi-
cial policy of balancing state and national interests as a prefer-
able middle position between the strict judicial restraint de-
manded by the earliest New Deal appointees and Justice Jack-
son's activism on behalf of the national market. 6' In any event,
by the time of Parker v Brown, decided in 1943, Chief Justice
Stone appears to have departed somewhat from his earlier ap-
Wiley Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith 68-70 (Kansas 1947) (emphasis
added).
' Id at 68.
'Carter v Virginia, 321 US 131, 138 (1944) (Jackson concurring).
" Stone was sworn in as Chief Justice on July 3, 1941, and took his seat on October 6.
27 Va L Rev 1, 19-28 (1940).
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proach. Although upholding California's marketing scheme for
raisins, which included a minimum-price regulation for produc-
ers, the Chief Justice did not expressly employ the available, and
straightforward, nondiscrimination rationale used in Barnwell.62
Possibly the fact that, unlike the case with the minimum-price
regulation upheld in Eisenberg, most of the raisins were exported
to other states prompted Stone to at least acknowledge the na-
tional interest involved." He stated the relevant test as follows:
"the reconciliation of the power thus granted [to Congress under
the Commerce Clause] with that reserved to the state is to be at-
tained by the accommodation of the competing demands of the
state and national interests involved."' Because of the Secretary
of Agriculture's policy of cooperating with the promotion of the
state program, Stone was easily able to conclude that in this par-
ticular case both interests pointed towards upholding the state
scheme.'65
Southern Pacific Co v Arizona, decided in 1945 over the dis-
sents of Justices Black and Douglas, was the first major case
since 1938 to invalidate a state statute regulating goods on
Commerce Clause grounds.' 6 It is also the case that is usually
cited as formally ushering in the modern balancing approach to
the Commerce Clause. This approach entails, as Chief Justice
Stone makes clear in his majority opinion, a role for the Court in
excess of that so emphatically stipulated in Barnwell; hence the
dissents. On the other hand, even if taken at face value as a de-
scription of what the Court actually does in Commerce Clause
cases, this new role explicitly acknowledges and takes into ac-
count state interests in a way that the Lochner era's national
market vision did not.
At issue in Southern Pacific was an Arizona statute regu-
lating the length of both passenger and freight trains operating
in the state. Clearly, as in Barnwell, this statute had a signifi-
cant impact on interstate transportation, requiring either de-
tours to avoid the state, decoupling of longer trains before en-
"Parker, 317 US 341, 362 (1943). Parker is better known as a leading antitrust case
that established the "state action" doctrine, which holds that state action is immune from
federal antitrust law. Since this doctrine is a matter of the interpretation of the Sherman
Act rather than a principle of constitutional law (i.e., it does not say that the states could
not constitutionally be subject to the Act), it is not a further instance of a preexisting con-
stitutional constraint on state power lifted by the Roosevelt era Court.
" Compare id at 345 with text accompanying notes 142-46.
.. Id at 362.
"BId at 368.
16325 US 761, 783-84 (1945). Again, this statement does not include state tax cases or
Edwards v California (free movement of persons). See note 141.
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tering the state, or the added cost of shorter trains for the whole
length of the interstate journey."7 Citing Parker and his own
1927 dissenting opinion in Di Santo v Pennsylvania which had
rejected the then-dominant direct-indirect burden test as too
formalistic, Chief Justice Stone stated that between the extremes
of statutes that are plainly either within or outside state power
lies the infinite variety of cases, in which regulation of local
matters may also operate as a regulation of commerce, in
which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and na-
tional power is to be attained only by some appraisal and ac-
commodation of the competing demands of the state and na-
tional interests involved. '
Moreover, it is "this Court, and not the state legislature, [which]
is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing
demands of state and national interests."'69
This duty of balancing state and national interests thus
added a third prong to the two stated to exhaust the judicial task
in Barnwell, for the existence of a rational basis for the state's
legislative judgment to regulate train lengths even-handedly does
not, contrary to Barnwell, automatically render the state statute
valid. Rather, the strong national interest in an adequate, eco-
nomical, and efficient railway system means that in passing
safety measures, a state cannot go beyond what is "plainly essen-
tial" to achieve that end; only Congress may do so, through a na-
tionwide rule. 70 In effect we are back at Cooley, for the decision
whether there is a need for uniform regulation appears to deter-
mine the strength of the national interest involved. Indeed, in at-
tempting to justify the different treatment of interstate highways
and railways in the two cases, Chief Justice Stone stated that the
former but not the latter were "local" under the Cooley test so
that states have far more extensive control over highways than
railways. And in terms of justifying this differential classifica-
tion, Stone pointed to the fact that, unlike railways, the states
build, own, and maintain highways and are responsible for their
safety.'7' In these circumstances, he argued, regulations that ap-
ply even-handedly to domestic and interstate shippers are a suf-
ficient safeguard against regulatory abuse.'72 This, of course, is
"
6 7Id at 773.
" Id at 768-69 (internal citation omitted), citing Parker, 317 US at 362, and Di Santo
v Pennsylvania, 273 US 34,43-45 (1927) (Stone dissenting).
'"Southern Pacific, 325 US at 769.
"OId at 781-82.
... Id at 783.
172 Id.
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the real judgment that the Court is required to make under
Stone's test, as it was under all the previous tests: when is non-
discriminatory state regulation of interstate commerce sufficient
to pass muster under the Commerce Clause. For the Lochner era
Court, the general answer was never; since 1938, the answer had
been always; now in 1945 the answer was seemingly less clear
and categorical, as under the original Cooley test.
In dissent, Justices Black and Douglas predictably flung
back at Chief Justice Stone his statements in Barnwell concern-
ing the proper judicial role, and condemned the majority for
abruptly departing from a long line of recent decisions. Justice
Black accused the Court of once again acting as a "super-
legislature" in overruling the state legislature's judgment for
which there was a clear rational basis and in its place deciding
that it is unwise government policy to regulate the length of
trains. In another classic statement of the essential principle of
New Deal constitutionalism, which applied to both the Commerce
and Due Process Clauses, he stated that
the determination of whether it is in the interest of society
for the length of trains to be governmentally regulated is a
matter of public policy. Someone must fix that policy-either
the Congress, or the state, or the courts. A century and a
half of constitutional history and government admonishes
this Court to leave that choice to the elected legislative rep-
resentatives of the people themselves, where it properly be-
longs both on democratic principles and the requirements of
efficient government.'73
In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas restated for the ump-
teenth time the early New Dealers' basic view that "the courts
should intervene only where the state legislation discriminated
against interstate commerce or was out of harmony with laws
which Congress had enacted" and that "[w]hether the question
arises under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, . . . the [state] legislation is entitled to a presumption of
validity."'74
After the flurry of Commerce Clause activity that we have
documented during the late 1930s and 1940s ending with South-
ern Pacific and Hood-which despite Justice Jackson's national-
ist rhetoric appears to have invalidated a New York milk regula-
'"Id at 789 (Black dissenting). See also id at 788 n 4 (accusing Court of acting as a
"super-legislature); id at 790-91 (condemning majority for departing from a long line of
precedents).
1 Id at 795-96 (Douglas dissenting).
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tion scheme on straightforwardly protectionist grounds' 75-- the
Court largely forgot about the Clause until the mid-1970s when
its interest waxed again for a period of about ten years. During
this period, however, the Court made no more than interstitial
changes to the immediate post-war approach.76 There is a good
deal of academic controversy over whether in terms of the Court's
actual practice, official doctrine aside, this approach is more ac-
curately described as balancing state and national interests case-
by-case or as promoting a constitutional norm of equal treat-
ment, whereby state laws are invalidated only, but then auto-
matically, if they have (in one version) discriminatory impact on
out-of-state goods or (in the other version) a protectionist pur-
pose."' Under the balancing test, discrimination would be suffi-
cient but not necessary for a violation, as arguably in Southern
Pacific itself. But whichever of these positions one takes, it
seems clear that the modern approach is both more permissive
towards state regulatory authority than the nationalist model of
the Lochner era and less permissive than during the New Deal
period itself.
IV. PREEMPTION
The third way in which the Court enhanced state regulatory
power during the New Deal era was through its modification of
the doctrine of preemption. Congress's power to preempt state
law and state lawmaking authority in an area of otherwise con-
current constitutional power is clearly an enormously important
one from the perspective of federalism. Despite its great practical
impact on the states, however, this power is generally assumed
to raise no difficult issues-other perhaps than that of when it
has been exercised-and certainly no interesting ones. Accord-
ingly, it has largely been ignored by constitutional scholars.
In previous work, I have attempted to point out what these
scholars have missed in so doing and how the general assump-
tion they share is seriously mistaken.'78 For present purposes, let
me summarize the relevant parts of my previous work in the fol-
lowing four propositions. First, the principle of preemption is in-
dependent of, and additional to, the principle of the supremacy of
federal law since unlike the latter it is not limited to cases of ac-
tual conflict between state and federal law. 79 Second, Congress's
17 See Regan, 84 Mich L Rev at 1262-68 (cited in note 88).
See Eule, 91 Yale L J at 427 (cited in note 88).
'"See note 88.
'" See generally Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev 767 (cited in note 3).
'"Accordingly, the power of preemption cannot derive from the Supremacy Clause,
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power to preempt state law and lawmaking authority, as con-
trasted with the operation of the Supremacy Clause to trump
state laws that conflict substantively with federal enactments,
was not definitively acknowledged and established until the be-
ginning of the second decade of this century during the Lochner
era when the Court, as we have seen in the section on the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, was generally animated by concerns for
the national market and the uniformity of regulation.18 ° Third,
from the time that the power of preemption was established until
the New Deal era, the Court held that federal legislation in a
given area automatically preempts state law and lawmaking
authority in that same area, just as a federal law automatically
trumps conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause. 1 '
Fourth, during the New Deal era, the Court substantially revised
its preemption doctrine by replacing this automatic feature with
a new requirement that state law is preempted if and only if
Congress intends the federal statute in question to have this ef-
fect, and has clearly manifested such intent.'82 This change from
a presumption of preemption to one of nonpreemption enhanced
the constitutional position of the states and was part of the
Court's attempt to restructure and reset the federalism balance
in the new context." In my earlier work, I have defended each of
these four propositions at considerable length and it is not neces-
sary or appropriate to repeat my entire analysis here. Instead, I
will focus only on the three historical claims, which are the most
relevant ones for present purposes, and even here only to the ex-
tent necessary to show that the pattern they disclose is entirely
consistent with that seen in the other areas already analyzed.'
The Supreme Court did not clearly and unequivocally recog-
nize a congressional power of preemption until the second decade
of the twentieth century. At this time, the clash between the in-
creasingly exercised regulatory powers of both state and federal
governments, and the need perceived by the Court for uniform
regulation that we saw in the dormant Commerce Clause con-
text, made resolution of an issue that had remained unresolved-
and at times highly controversial-throughout the nineteenth
but stems rather from the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article . See id at 770-85.
"See id at 795-805.
"'Id at 801-05.
Id at 805-07. See also David E. Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45
U Colo L Rev 51, 53-55 (1973).
'Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 806 (cited in note 3). For a similar argument, see
Lessig, 1995 S Ct Rev at 167-68 (cited in note 15).
'The rest of this section is largely a summarized version of my argument in Gard-
baum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 795-807 (cited in note 3).
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century particularly urgent. For the forty years or so prior to
1910, the Court had exhibited both confusion and ambivalence
regarding the impact of federal legislation on the states: does the
general, constitutionally concurrent state lawmaking authority
in a given area end where there is any federal legislation of that
same area (preemption), or is it only the case that particular
state laws are trumped where they actually conflict with the con-
tent of the federal legislation (supremacy)?1" The period from
1912-1920 marked the end of the prevailing confusion, with the
Court issuing for the first time consistently clear and explicit
statements of genuine preemption principles: it is not merely
current conflicting state laws that are overridden by a federal
law on the same subject, but also the general authority of the
state to enact any laws in that area in the future---even those
that are consistent with and supplement federal law.186 The effect
of congressional action is to end the concurrent power of the
states and thereby to create exclusive power at the federal level
from that time on; a result that the principle of supremacy can-
not by itself accomplish.
As I have claimed in my previous work, the first case in
which the Court invalidated a state statute on preemption
grounds was Southern Railway Co v Reid, decided in 1912.18 In
Reid, the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act had
"taken possession of the field" of interstate railroad rate regula-
tion and that consequently both existing state laws (including the
North Carolina statute requiring transportation of tendered
freight at issue) and future exercises of state lawmaking author-
ity in the field had been "superseded." The Court stated that "if
the State and Congress have a concurrent power, that of the
ISee, for example, Morgan's Steamship Co v Louisiana Board of Health, 118 US 455,
464 (1886) ("whenever Congress shall undertake to provide... a general system of quar-
antine... all state laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are in-
consistent"); Reid v Colorado, 187 US 137, 146-48 (1902) (stating both positions).
Thus in Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co v Varnville Furniture Co, Jus-
tice Holmes stated
that [the alleged absence of conflict between state and federal law] is immaterial
[under preemption analysis]. When Congress has taken the particular subject-
matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be
declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.
237 US 597, 604 (1915) (citation omitted). In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Co v Tonsellito, Justice McReynolds stated that "Congress having declared when, how far,
and to whom carriers shall be liable on account of accidents in the specified class, such li-
ability can neither be extended nor abridged by common or statutory laws of the State."
244 US 360, 362 (1917).
1222 US 424 (1912). See Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 803 (cited in note 3); see
also Lessig, 1995 S Ct Rev at 166 (cited in note 15).
[64:483
New Deal Constitutionalism
State is superseded when the power of Congress is exercised.""s
All that was needed to find preemption was "specific action" by
Congress "covering the matters which the statute of North Caro-
lina attempts to regulate."8 9
Having in Reid employed the newly acknowledged power of
preemption to strike down a state statute for the first time, the
Court was to do so on many other occasions between 1912 and
1920; this was, of course, in addition to those state statutes
struck down even in the absence of federal action under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.' ° An important and distinctive feature
characterized the congressional power of preemption that the
Court acknowledged and applied for the first time during these
years: preemption was an automatic consequence of federal leg-
islative action in a given field. The Court made no systematic
reference to congressional intent as the necessary trigger for pre-
emption (or to "occupation of a field" as the evidence of that in-
tent); rather, as it stated in Reid, where the states and Congress
have concurrent power, "that of the State [was] superseded when
the power of Congress [was] exercised." 9' Or, as Chief Justice
White stated the following year, "[I]t must follow in consequence
of the action of Congress [the Hepburn Act of 1906] that the
power of the State over the subject-matter ceased to exist from
the moment that Congress exerted its paramount and all em-
bracing authority over the subject."'92
The preemptive effect of federal legislation was conceived of
as an automatic feature of the Constitution's structure--just like
the trumping effect of federal law on conflicting state law under
the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, this conception of preemption
was derived by the Court from its invention of a new jurisdic-
tional category of "latent exclusivity" that it thought followed
from the "paramount" nature of federal power over interstate
commerce granted by the Supremacy Clause: Congress had
something less than exclusive power from the outset but more
than merely concurrent power with the states. Under latent ex-
clusivity, the states had "permissive" power to act until Congress
exercised its "inherent" power under the Commerce Clause;' 93
1 Id at 436.
Id at 437.
'See Alexander Bickel and Benno Schmidt, The Judiciary and Responsible Govern-
ment, 1910-1921 264-76 (Macmillan 1984) for details of some of the other preemption de-
cisions during this decade.
"'Reid, 222 US at 436.
'"Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co v Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co, 226
US 426, 435 (1913).
'"Justice Harlan first used these terms in Reid v Colorado, 187 US 137, 148-50
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preemption was thus originally understood more as a doctrine
concerning the constitutional allocation of power over commerce
than in the modern sense as a general, discretionary power of
Congress.
The modem approach to preemption replaced this original
one during the New Deal era when the Court first qualified the
power by rejecting its automatic operation in favor of a new re-
quirement that a federal statute would have preemptive effect
only if Congress clearly and affirmatively manifested its intent
that it should do so. As the Court frequently pointed out, this
new understanding created a presumption of nonpreemption-in
place of what in effect was previously an irrebuttable presump-
tion of preemption. The first case in which the Court clearly an-
nounced and applied its new approach was Mintz v Baldwin,"4
decided in 1933, after which the Court consistently reaffirmed
the centrality of intent throughout the New Deal period, culmi-
nating in the locus classicus of modern preemption doctrine, Rice
v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 5 decided in 1947.
In Mintz, the issue was the continuing validity of state
regulation to prevent infectious cattle diseases in light of Con-
gress's Cattle Contagious Diseases Acts of 1903 and 1905.6
Having found no substantive conflict between the state and fed-
eral statutes in an area of concurrent power, the Court stated the
circumstances under which state authority can nonetheless be
preempted as follows:
Unless limited by the exercise of federal authority under the
commerce clause, the State has power to make and enforce
the order [at issue]. The purpose of Congress to supersede or
exclude state action against the ravages of the disease is not
lightly to be inferred. The intention so to do must definitely
and clearly appear. 19
7
Although the Court cited two cases from the founding period of
preemption in support of this statement, nothing in these or any
other cases from that period gave such a central and necessary
role to congressional intent in preemption analysis. 98
(1902).
L"289 US 346 (1933).
m 331 US 218 (1947).
'289 US at 348. The Acts in question were 32 Stat 791 (1903) and 33 Stat 1263
(1905).
'Mintz, 289 US at 350 (citation omitted).
'Although there were a few isolated references to congressional intent in cases prior
to 1912, such as the 1902 case of Reid v Colorado, 187 US at 148, once preemption was
firmly and unequivocally established, there was little if any reference to clearly mani-
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The qualification of Congress's power of preemption was
both a reaction to the increased exercise of existing federal leg-
islative authority prior to 1937 as the Roosevelt Administration
attempted to counter the effects of the Great Depression, and an
intrinsic part of the Court's restructuring of federalism after
1937. The new constitutional strategy was the reverse of the old
one: in place of relatively constrained federal powers coupled
with the automatic preemption of the states when these powers
were exercised, the Court combined the enlargement of the per-
missible scope of congressional power with a presumption that
state authority survives the exercise of these powers unless
clearly ended by Congress. The most explicit statement of this
reconstruction of federalism came from Justice Frankfurter, al-
beit in 1947 and in the context of a dissenting opinion that ex-
pressed an even stronger presumption against preemption than
the majority was willing to impose. Frankfurter stated as follows:
Federal legislation... must be construed with due regard to
accommodation between the assertions of new federal
authority and the functions of the individual States, as re-
flecting the historic and persistent concerns of our dual sys-
tem of government. Since Congress can, if it chooses, en-
tirely displace the States to the full extent of the far-
reaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from
generous judicial implications to achieve the supersession of
State authority. To construe federal legislation so as not
needlessly to forbid preexisting State authority is to respect
our federal system. Any indulgence in construction should be
in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with
drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal
authority, completely displacing the States.'99
A similar statement of the connection between federal com-
merce power and preemption had been made by Justice Stone
shortly before he assumed the office of Chief Justice in 1941, also
in dissent. He wrote that
At a time when the exercise of the federal power is being
rapidly expanded through Congressional action, it is difficult
to overstate the importance of safeguarding against such
diminution of state power [as the majority was here engag-
ing in] by vague inferences as to what Congress might have
fested congressional intent to preempt as a necessary condition of the exercise of the
power. See text accompanying notes 191-92.
"Bethlehem Steel Co v State Labor Relations Board, 330 US 767, 779-80 (1947)
(Frankfurter dissenting).
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intended if it had considered the matter or by reference to
our own conceptions of a policy which Congress has not ex-
pressed and which is not plainly to be inferred from the leg-
islation which it has enacted. °
Indeed, Stone sought to narrow Congress's power of preemption
as far as possible without denying it altogether, for in his dissent
he relied on
the long established principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion that an exercise by the state of its police power, which
would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is super-
seded only where the repugnance or conflict is so "direct and
positive" that the two acts cannot "be fairly reconciled or
consistently stand together."
20 1
While this statement could be read to deny the existence of a
separate power of preemption altogether by asserting that only
the principle of supremacy limits concurrent state power-a
radically narrow view of federal power that harks back to nine-
teenth century controversies on the issue20 2 -Justice Stone's ear-
lier statement makes clear what he meant. Only an unambigu-
ous express preemption provision (with which the attempted ex-
ercise of state power would conflict) or an actual first-order con-
flict between the substance of federal and state laws should op-
erate to preempt the states. °"
Whereas in Mintz, the Court did not specify how Congress
can clearly manifest its intention to preempt the states but only
that it is required to do so, Rice sets out both the classic state-
ment of the presumption against preemption and specifies the
various ways in which the necessary congressional intent to pre-
'Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 75 (1941) (Stone dissenting). Hines was an atypical
preemption case in that it dealt with a state statute regulating the registration of aliens,
a particular issue over which according to Black's opinion for the Court, "[any concurrent
state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits; the state's power here
is not bottomed on the same broad base as its power to tax." Id at 68 (majority opinion).
And again, even if power over this subject is not exclusive to Congress (and the Court did
not consider it necessary to consider this question), it "is not an equal and continuously
existing concurrent power of state and nation, but [rather] whatever power a state may
have is subordinate to supreme national law." Id (footnote omitted). Because of the tradi-
tional claims of the national government on all matters dealing with immigration, natu-
ralization, and aliens, the majority in Hines effectively treated this subject as uniquely
governed by the old and generally discarded conception of latent exclusivity, so that any
federal legislation in the area would preempt the states.
" Id at 80 (Stone dissenting), quoting Sinnot v Davenport, 63 US (22 How) 227, 243
(1859).
'See Gardbaum, 79 Cornell L Rev at 787-800 (cited in note 3).
'This view of Congress's power of preemption was shared, as we shall see, by Justice
Frankfurter. See text accompanying notes 207-08.
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empt may be evidenced. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
began his preemption analysis by setting out the modern first
principles:
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied.... So we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act [United States Warehouse
Act] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress.2 °'
He proceeded to list several ways in which such a purpose may
be evidenced:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it.... Or the Act of Congress
may touch a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude en-
forcement of state laws on the same subject [citing Hines]
.... Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent
with the objective of the federal statute. 5
It may be noted that Douglas omitted from this list the most
straightforward and unproblematic way for Congress to manifest
its intent to preempt: namely, by express provision. This omis-
sion is particularly surprising since the majority held the chal-
lenged state law was (partially) preempted on this ground. It in-
terpreted the 1931 Amendments to Section 29 of the United
States Warehouse Act that "the power, jurisdiction, and author-
ity" of the Secretary of Agriculture conferred under the Act "shall
be exclusive with respect to all persons" licensed under the Act as
clearly manifesting Congress's purpose of "terminating the
[previous] dual system of regulation."2"
It might well be thought that Douglas's specification of the
ways in which Congress may evidence its "clear and manifest
purpose" to preempt actually dilutes the New Deal Court's pre-
sumption against preemption in that by recognizing "implied
preemption," it accepts as conclusive evidence of congressional
'Rice, 331 US at 230 (citation omitted).
'Id (citation omitted). Justice Douglas acknowledged the distinction between the
congressional power of preemption and the principle of supremacy when he added, "[ilt is
often a perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice
of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the states undisturbed except
as the state and federal regulations collide." Id at 230-31.
'Id at 233-34, quoting 39 Stat 486, 490 (1916), as amended in 46 Stat 1463, 1465
(1931).
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purpose actions that seem far from unambiguous in this regard.
This, at least, was the view of Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge
in dissent. Frankfurter reiterated the narrower view of Con-
gress's power of preemption that he had expressed a few months
earlier in Bethlehem Steel Co v New York State Labor Relations
Board"7 and that he shared with Chief Justice Stone, who had
* died the previous year, although of course even the majority view
was far more restrictive than the automatic conception that the
Court had unanimously rejected. According to Frankfurter, who
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the relevant sec-
tion of the Act, the states are preempted only by a clear and ex-
press congressional provision or as the result of an actual, irrec-
oncilable conflict between state and federal laws. 08
V. INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AGAINST THE STATES
The issue of the precise relationship of the constitutional
limitations imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment
to those imposed on the federal government by the Bill of Rights
has had a long and troublesome history. Beginning in the mid-
1880s, the Court acknowledged for the first time that some of the
rights included in the Bill of Rights may also bind the states be-
cause they are so fundamental that their violation would consti-
tute a denial of due process of law. Under this "fundamental
rights" approach to the issue, the Court during the 1920s in par-
ticular applied a number of the more central rights contained in
-330 US 767, 779-80 (1947) (Frankfurter separate opinion).
'Justice Frankfurter expressed these views as follows:
And so we have once more the duty of judicially adjusting the interests of both the
Nation and the State, where Congress has not clearly asserted its power of preemp-
tion so as to leave no doubt that the separate interests of the States are left wholly to
national protection.
Suffice it to say that due regard for our federalism ... favors survival of the reserved
authority of a State over matters that are the intimate concern of the State unless
Congress has clearly swept the boards of all State authority, or the State's claim is in
unmistakable conflict with what Congress has ordered.
Rice, 331 US at 241 (Frankfurter dissenting). He concluded that, "[slo long as full scope
can be given to the ... [federal] legislation without undermining non-conflicting State
laws, nothing but the clearest expression should persuade us that the federal Act wiped
out [State authority]." Id at 245.
It was not until the early 1990s that the Court made overtures toward Stone's and
Frankfurter's position by imposing a "plain statement rule" of statutory interpretation in
preemption cases, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 460-61 (1991) (rule requires Congress
to make clear in the language of the statute if it intends to preempt state law), although
the Court does not appear to consider this "rule" inconsistent with the doctrine of implied
preemption, which it continues to recognize.
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the first eight amendments-such as free speech and free exer-
cise of religion-against the states for the first time. By contrast,
the record of the Court during the New Deal era was less expan-
sive on the subject, bringing to a virtual halt this previous trend
of incorporating new constitutional rights against the states-a
trend that would not start again until the 1960s.
The fundamental rights approach that the Court adopted
when it considered the general issue of the relationship of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights for the first time in
the 1884 case of Hurtado v California, was simply a particular
application of substantive due process under which all funda-
mental rights, including the right to contract, were deemed part
of the "liberty" protected against the states by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
In Twining v New Jersey, the Court affirmed this approach
to the Bill of Rights and set out at considerable length its meth-
odology for applying it in the context of rejecting the defendant's
claim that a right against self-incrimination was guaranteed
against the states. The Court stated that although some of the
rights in the Bill of Rights may also apply against the states, this
is not because of their enumeration in the first eight amend-
ments, but because they are "included in the conception of due
process of law."21 ° Under this approach, the key question is
whether "the exemption from self-incrimination is . .. a funda-
mental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very
idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of
such a government.""' In answering this broad question, how-
ever, the Court looked overwhelmingly to the historical meaning
of "due process of law" within the common law tradition, which it
stated to be an important, albeit not necessarily a conclusive, aid.
Its historical analysis focused first on certain familiar "great in-
struments [of the English common law] in which we are accus-
tomed to look for the declaration of... fundamental rights," such
as Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights
(1689), and then on the question whether the privilege was con-
ceived in the United States to be fundamental and inherent in
the concept of due process at the time the first ten amendments
were proposed and ratified.2" Finding that in neither case was
110 US 516, 535-36 (1884) (holding that Fifth Amendment right to indictment by
grand jury in federal felony cases does not apply to the states).
211 US 78, 99 (1908).
2111d at 106.
"'Id at 107-10. Altogether the Court's historical analysis of the meaning of due proc-
ess of law within the common law tradition occupied over fifteen of the sixteen pages of
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the privilege against self-incrimination considered an essential
part of due process of law, the Court concluded that there was no
reason to strain the meaning of the term contained in the Four-
teenth Amendment by including this privilege within it.21
Nonetheless, under this fundamental rights approach, the
Lochner era Court did apply a number of important rights con-
tained in the Bill of Rights against the states for the first time.
In 1897, the Court held that the right to compensation for private
property taken for public use contained in the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was also guaranteed against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.214 In Meyer v Nebraska, de-
cided in 1923, the Court declared that the "liberty" guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause includes not only the right of the indi-
vidual to contract but also, among other things, "the right of the
individual... to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience,"215 and it clarified this language by explicitly holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment includes protection of the right
to free exercise of religion in Pierce v Society of Sisters in 1925."6
In Gitlow v New York, also decided in 1925, the Court acknowl-
edged that "freedom of speech and of the press ... are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the States." 217 Finally, in Powell v Alabama in 1932, it held
that the indigent's right to appointed counsel in capital cases,
which was part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance
of counsel, applied to the states as well as to the federal govern-
ment.
2 18
In principle, and notwithstanding vigorous opposition from
Justices Black and Douglas for the apparent inconsistency, the
the opinion dealing with the defendant's due process claim.
"After concluding its lengthy historical analysis, the Court added that
[e]ven if the historical meaning of due process of law... did not exclude the privilege
from it, it would be going far to rate it as an immutable principle ofjustice which is
the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free government.... It has no place in
the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common
law, and it is nowhere observed among our own people in the search for truth out-
side the administration of the law.
Id at 113.
"'Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co v Chicago, 166 US 226 (1897).
21262 US 390,399 (1923).
216268 US 510, 534-35 (1925).
21268 US 652, 666 (1925). The "incorporation" of these two First Amendment rights
was explicitly reaffirmed during the 1930 term. See Stromberg v California, 283 US 359,
368 (1931) (freedom of speech); Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, 707 (1931) (freedom of the
press).
218287 US 45, 59-73 (1932).
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Court during the New Deal period continued to adhere to the
Lochner era's fundamental rights approach to the Due Process
Clause as it applied specifically to the Bill of Rights, even though
it rejected this approach (under the guise of substantive due
process) as a general one for interpreting the clause. In practice,
however, the Court subtly reinterpreted the fundamental rights
approach in a way that made it significantly more difficult to
successfully claim that state infringement of a right recognized
against the federal government was a violation of due process. As
a result, the very clear trend over the previous fifteen years of
recognizing new constitutional rights against the states was
largely brought to a halt and did not really emerge again until
the entire approach was abandoned in favor of "selective incorpo-
ration" during the 1960s, when most of the Bill of Rights dealing
with the rights of the criminally accused was incorporated
against the states.219
Palko v Connecticut, decided in 1937, was the case in which
the Court, while ostensibly adhering to the fundamental rights
approach, nonetheless reinterpreted it in a manner that in prac-
tical terms was far more favorable to the states. Palko held that
a state statute permitting appeal by the state for error of law and
retrial in criminal cases did not violate the Due Process Clause
even though the Court assumed for the sake of argument that
such a statute would have violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment if enacted by Congress." °
As we have seen, the test announced in Twining, although
framed in broad and universalistic terms, focused in its applica-
tion primarily on whether the particular right at issue could be
deemed fundamental or essential to due process of law as under-
stood within the common law tradition. After 1908, and particu-
larly in the 1920s when the Court incorporated most of the First
Amendment, this contextual methodology became even more cen-
tral and conclusive than in Twining itself. Thus, in Meyer, the
2
"This is not to say that the Court failed to protect the constitutional rights that had
already been incorporated against the states. Indeed, as is wel-known, in a series of
cases starting with Schneider v State, 308 US 147, 162-63 (1939), and culminating in the
second flag salute case, West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624,
642 (1943), the Court exhibited unprecedented concern for freedom of speech and of the
press. Moreover in Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 303-07 (1940), the Court invali-
dated a state statute on free exercise of religion grounds for the first time. It is, however,
to cast some doubt on the received wisdom that the New Deal Court was an unqualified
defender of civil liberties. For a discussion of the Hughes Court as the source of modern
First Amendment jurisprudence, see David Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional
Transformation, 10 Const Comm 133 (1993). On the Hughes Court's civil rights record,
see Higginbotham and Smith, 76 Minn L Rev 1099 (cited in note 14).
302 US 319, 322-23 (1937).
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Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes all "those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men,""' and elsewhere it said that the clause requires state
action to "be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political insti-
tutions."" Indeed, only three years before his opinion for the
Court in Palko, Justice Cardozo had summarized the test applied
in such cases as Hurtado, Twining, and Powell as whether a
state violates a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'
In Palko, after expressly rejecting the doctrine of total incor-
poration and listing both those rights that the Court had and had
not previously incorporated, Justice Cardozo sought to identify
the "rationalizing principle" that explains and justifies the line of
division between the two lists. He suggested that this principle
was whether the right in question was "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty." He continued as follows:
Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a
fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without [the right to trial by jury and immunity from prose-
cution except upon indictment]. What is true of jury trials
and indictments is true also, as the cases show, of the im-
munity from compulsory self-incrimination. This too might
be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past
there are students of our penal system who look upon the
immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who
would limit its scope or destroy it altogether .... Justice,
however, would not perish if the accused were subject to a
duty to respond to orderly inquiry.
At this point, Cardozo made explicit in a footnote exactly what he
had in mind: "Compulsory self-incrimination is part of the estab-
lished procedure in the law of Continental Europe .... Double
jeopardy too is not everywhere forbidden."2" This appears to cre-
ate an additional hurdle for any right that is claimed to be
"fundamental." Henceforth, not only must the right be funda-
mental to the notion of liberty within the particular context of
the history and practices of the common law tradition, but also
"'Meyer, 262 US at 399.
'Herbert v Louisiana, 272 US 312, 316 (1926).
'Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934) (citation omitted).
"'Palko, 302 US at 325-26 (citation and footnotes omitted).
Id at 326 n 3 (citation omitted).
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universally; only such rights as are universally recognized as
fundamental to liberty and justice across different legal systems
are part of the due process of law for the purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Of course, as the decisions of the Court over
the next twenty years were to prove, few of those rights not al-
ready recognized by the Court could realistically pass muster un-
der such a test. Justice Butler dissented from the decision."'
This new universalistic inquiry and its implications were
identified thirty years later by Justice Byron White in the heyday
of the Warren Court's rejection of the fundamental rights ap-
proach. Writing for the Court in the 1968 case of Duncan v Lou-
isiana, which held the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial appli-
cable to the states and thereby overruled the precedents to the
contrary,227 Justice White explained the differences between the
Palko test and the current one as follows:
In one sense recent cases applying provisions of the first
eight Amendments to the States represent a new approach
to the 'incorporation' debate. Earlier the Court can be seen
as having asked... if a civilized system could be imagined
that would not accord the particular protection. [Citing
Palko.] The recent cases, on the other hand, have proceeded
upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes are
not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems
bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law
system that has been developing contemporaneously in
England and in this country. The question thus is whether
given this kind of system a particular procedure is funda-
mental-whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.
White then spelled out the practical difference between these two
approaches. He continued,
When the inquiry is approached in this way the question
whether the State can impose criminal punishment without
granting a jury trial appears quite different from the way it
appeared in the older cases .... A criminal process which
was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine.
It would make use of alternative guarantees and protections
which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the
English and American systems. Yet no American State has
'Id at 329 (Butler dissenting).
391 US 145, 157-58 (1968), overruling Walker v Sauvinet, 92 US 90 (1875), Maxwell
v Dow, 176 US 581 (1900), New York Central Railroad Co v White, 243 US 188 (1917),
and Wagner Electric Manufacturing Co v Lyndon, 262 US 226 (1923).
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undertaken to construct such a system.... In every State
... the structure and style of the criminal process ... are
the sort that naturally complement jury trial, and have de-
veloped in connection with and in reliance upon jury trial."
Although White correctly dates the "old", universal approach to
Cardozo's opinion in Palko, it would be inaccurate to paint the
fundamental rights approach as a whole with this brush. As we
have seen, prior to Palko, the Court had consistently emphasized
that whether a right is to be deemed fundamental for due process
purposes is to be determined contextually within the common
law tradition.
Having in its holding in Palko rejected application of the
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause to the state statute
at issue in the case, while approving in dicta previous decisions
refusing to incorporate the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination, to prosecution by indictment, and to
trial by jury, 9 the Court five years later conspicuously refused to
apply its own 1938 expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel against the states. In Johnson v Zerbst, over the dissents
of Justices Butler and McReynolds, the Court had held that the
Sixth Amendment requires federal courts to provide indigent de-
fendants with appointed counsel in all cases where their life or
liberty is at stake. ° In its 1942 decision in Betts v Brady, how-
ever, the Court held that this rule does not apply to the states
since criminal trials conducted without defense counsel are not
necessarily either "shocking to the universal sense of justice" or
"offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right" that define the due process limitation on state power un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment."8 Distinguishing the 1932 Pow-
ell precedent as applying only to capital cases, the Court held
that due process requires appointment of counsel only in those
particular trials where the "totality of facts" indicate that counsel
is necessary to ensure "fundamental principles of fairness."2
Betts was later famously overruled in the 1963 case of Gideon v
Wainwright, which fully incorporated the Sixth Amendment
right.
In fact, the only major new constitutional provision that the
Court applied against the states between Palko and the Warren
'Duncan, 391 US at 149-50 n 14.
'Palko, 302 US at 323-24 (citations omitted).
"'304 US 458,462-63 (1938).
"'316 US 455, 462, 473 (1942).
" Id at 462-64.
- 372 US 335, 345 (1963).
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Court era was the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, which it incorporated in the 1946 case of Everson v Board
of Education,' although it was not until 1962 that the Court ac-
tually invalidated state action on Establishment Clause
grounds. 5 In the well known 1947 case of Adamson v California,
the Court afred Twining and the Palko dicta by rejecting the
claim that the privilege against self-incrimination bound the
states under the Due Process Clause. 6 Writing for the Court, in
a generally unilluminating opinion (at least in comparison with
the other two opinions in the case), Justice Reed appears to have
applied the type of abstract, "natural law"-style of reasoning
called for under the Palko standard; certainly there was none of
the detailed historical and contextual analysis that characterized
the Court's opinion in Twining. " Reed stated that "[i]t seems
quite natural that when a defendant has opportunity to deny or
explain facts and determines not to do so, the prosecution should
bring out the strength of the evidence by commenting upon de-
fendant's failure to explain or deny it." And again, "[wihen evi-
dence is before a jury that threatens conviction, it does not seem
unfair to require him to choose between leaving the adverse evi-
dence unexplained and subjecting himself to impeachment
through disclosure of former crimes.""'
The case is best known as the one in which Justice Black (in
dissent) first set out in full force his theory of total incorporation
of the Bill of Rights by the Fourteenth Amendment, and Justice
Frankfurter responded by rejecting total or selective incorpora-
tion in favor of granting independent standing and meaning to
the textual provision "due process of law." It is important and in-
teresting to note, however, that in this one major area in which
Black's twin commitments to textualism and judicial restraint on
the one hand and the rights of the states on the other led to
something of a conflict, Frankfurter's commitments to both did
not.
-330 US 1 (1946). This fact is ironic because the Establishment Clause surely fails
the universal test of Palko. Many "civilized" countries (including England) still have es-
tablished state religions.
'Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962) (invalidating nondenominational prayer com-
posed by state officials that was required to be recited in public schools every morning).
"332 US 46, 53-58 (1947).
'In his Adamson concurrence, Justice Frankfurter greatly praised the opinion in
Twining, saying that it "shows the judicial process at its best--comprehensive briefs and
powerful arguments on both sides, followed by long deliberation, resulting in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Moody which at once gained and has ever since retained recognition as one
of the outstanding opinions in the history of the Court." Adamson, 332 US at 59
(Frankfurter concurring).
'Adamson, 332 US at 56, 57 (majority opinion).
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For Justice Black (and for Justice Douglas), the fundamental
rights approach was simply substantive due process under a dif-
ferent name, inviting the Court to engage in the type of "natural
law" reasoning that had elsewhere been used to illegitimately
limit state power under the Constitution. The appeal of total in-
corporation was the appeal of textualism generally: by tying the
meaning of the vague text of the Due Process Clause to the text
of the first eight amendments, it would do away with the type of
reasonableness and fundamental fairnessr tests that enabled the
Court to usurp the policymaking function of state legislatures.
According to Black,
It is an illusory apprehension that literal application of some
or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the States
would unwisely increase the sum total of the powers of this
Court to invalidate state legislation.... It must be conceded,
of course, that the natural-law-due-process formula, which
the Court today reaffirms, has [recently] been interpreted to
limit substantially this Court's power to prevent state viola-
tions of the individual civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. [Citing Betts.] But this formula also has been used
in the past, and can be used in the future, to license this
Court, in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at large
in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to trespass,
all too freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well
as the Federal Government." 9
Moreover, Black insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the first eight amendments and nothing more. Un-
like the Lochner era Court, which found open-ended lists of
rights included in the Due Process Clause (as illustrated, for ex-
ample, by Meyer), Black consistently rejected claims that the Due
Process Clause entailed rights against the states that were not
specifically listed in the text of the Bill of Rights.' °
Frankfurter's concurrence in Adamson was in large part a
response to Black's argument, showing that here as elsewhere
the connection between textualism and protection of the states
can be maintained. What separated Frankfurter from Black in
the incorporation controversy was not textualism as a method of
constitutional interpretation, but different views as to which ap-
proach to the Due Process Clause textualism required. Whereas
Id at 90 (Black dissenting).
'See, for example, In re Winship, 397 US 358, 377-86 (1970) (Black dissenting from
decision that Due Process Clause protects the criminally accused against conviction ex-
cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
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for Black textualism required total incorporation as the only
plausible way to tie the vague Due Process Clause to constitu-
tional text, for Frankfurter such a move was a betrayal of textual
analysis since the presence of the clause at the end of the Fifth
Amendment clearly indicated that it was not reducible to, or a
shorthand statement of, other specific clauses in that amend-
ment but had independent meaning and "potency."
In his concurrence, Frankfurter relied on the universalistic
spirit of Palko to reject the defendant's due process claim: 'To
suggest that it is inconsistent with a truly free society to... take
into consideration that one who has full opportunity to make a
defense remains silent is . . .to confound the familiar with the
necessary."24 Moreover, Frankfurter defended this conception of
due process as alone consistent with a proper regard for the posi-
tion and power of the states. He suggested that the great Su-
preme Court Justices of the past who were best known for pro-
moting the interests of liberty and human dignity rejected total
incorporation because "they were also judges mindful of the rela-
tion of our federal system to a progressively democratic society
and therefore duly regardful of the scope of authority that was
left to the States even after the Civil War."242 And rejecting
Black's claim that the fundamental rights approach, which
Frankfurter believed the only one consistent with textualist prin-
ciples, was tantamount to licensing personal preference, he
stated that "[aln important safeguard against such merely indi-
vidual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the
State court under review."=
It was not until the 1960s that a majority of the Court would
side with Justice Black over Justice Frankfurter-and even then
neither completely nor whole-heartedly-when it abandoned the
fundamental rights approach for that of selective incorporation.
The result was to overrule virtually every criminal procedure
precedent of the previous sixty years and, notwithstanding
Black's "illusory apprehension," to enhance significantly the
power of the Court to invalidate state legislation. In the span of
ten years starting in 1961, the Warren Court incorporated
"'Adamson, 332 US at 62-63 (Frankfurter concurring). And again:
The notion that to allow jurors to do that which sensible and right-minded men do
every day [make inferences from silence in the face of evidence which one has the
power to contradict] violates the 'immutable principles of justice' as conceived by a
civilized society is to trivialize the importance of'due process.'
Id at 60.
Id at 62.
"Id at 68.
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against the states every right of the criminally accused contained
in the Bill of Rights except the Fifth Amendment's requirement
of a grand jury indictment.'"
VI. STATE JUDICIAL POWER
Thus far in this Article, I have explained the ways in which
during the New Deal era the Court enhanced state legislative
power as compared with the previous era. In this part, I discuss
four different ways in which the Court also enhanced state judi-
cial power.
A. The Erie Doctrine
The landmark 1938 decision of Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins,
decided on the same day as Carolene Products, reaffirmed the
general doctrine of enumerated federal powers and, under its
authority, transferred lawmaking power over a wide and impor-
tant range of issues from the federal courts to the state courts
where, according to the majority, the Constitution had placed it.
Erie declared unconstitutional the power of the federal courts to
develop their own uniform body of unwritten "general jurispru-
dence" displacing state common law that had been authorized in
'"Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655 (1961) (Fourth Amendment right against unreason-
able search and seizure); Robinson v California, 370 US 660, 666 (1962) (Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335
(1963) (the right to counsel in all felony cases, overruling Betts); Malloy v Hogan, 378 US
1, 8 (1964) (right against compelled self-incrimination, overruling Twining and Adamson);
Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 406 (1965) (right to confront opposing witnesses); Klopfer v
North Carolina, 386 US 213, 223 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); Washington v Texas, 358
US 14, 19 (1967) (right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Duncan v Louisi-
ana, 391 US 145, 150 (1968) (right to jury trial in criminal cases); Benton v Maryland, 395
US 785, 796 (Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy, overruling Palko); Schilb
v Kuebel, 404 US 357 (1971) (right to be free from excessive bail).
Having incorporated the whole Bill of Rights except the Second, Third, and Seventh
Amendments (in addition to the grand jury provision of the Fifth), the only remaining is-
sues for the Warren Court were (a) did such rights apply in the same manner to the
states as to the federal government, and (b) was the meaning and content of the due
process guarantee against the states limited to the specific rights contained in the Bill of
Rights? Prior to the 1960s, the Court had held on at least two occasions that in answer to
(a) a lesser standard applies to the states. Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25, 33 (1949)
(Although the general right of security against arbitrary police intrusion binds the states,
the exclusionary rule as a specific manifestation of that right does not.); Roth v United
States, 354 US 476 (1957) (The First Amendment imposes fewer limits on state regulation
of obscenity than it does on federal regulation.). During the 1960s, the Court determined
that incorporated rights apply in exactly the same way to both governments. On the sec-
ond question, the Court in 1970 held that the Due Process Clause requires the states to
apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof in criminal cases even though no
such requirement applies to the federal government under the Bill of Rights. In re Win-
ship, 397 US 358 (1970).
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Swift v Tyson and exercised by them for the whole of the subse-
quent ninety-six years.24 Henceforth, a federal court deciding an
issue or claim based on state law (typically under its diversity ju-
risdiction) must apply only state law, including state common
law, and in so doing follow the decisions of the courts of the rele-
vant state. Contrary to previous practice, "[t]here is no federal
general common law" to be applied.2 As Hart and Sacks pro-
claimed in their famous teaching materials, "Probably no single
decision in the whole of Anglo-American legal history ever over-
turned so many prior decisions at a single stroke as Erie ....
Overnight, whole treatises were rendered obsolete."247 In abol-
ishing the category of federal law that these treatises expounded,
Erie reallocated lawmaking powers between state and nation,
enhancing the scope and impact of state law as declared by state
courts.24
Justice Brandeis's opinion for the majority in Erie overruled
Swift v Tyson on two separate grounds. First, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, Swift had wrongly interpreted the Rules
of Decision Act, originally enacted as Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789. This provision, still in its original form in 1938, pro-
vided that
The laws of the several States, except where the Constitu-
tion, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in tri-
als at common law, in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply.249
In Swift, Justice Story had held that the term "laws of the sev-
eral states" did not include state court common law decisions and
so left the federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction free in
matters of "general jurisprudence" (though not in matters of pe-
culiarly local concern) to develop their own independent federal
common law and apply it in disregard of state judicial decisions
as to the common law in that state.25 Relying on the "more re-
'Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 77-78 (1938), overruling Swift v Tyson, 41
US (16 Pet) 1, 17-18 (1842).
'Erie, 304 US at 78. See also id at 78-80.
Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 1338-39 (cited in note 18).
'At about the same time as Erie was decided, of course, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure came into effect. Although these had the converse effect to Erie (where previ-
ously federal courts applied state procedural rules, they now applied uniform federal
ones), unlike Erie, the Federal Rules were not constitutionally required. Indeed, their
promulgation was the result not of any constitutional decision on the part of the Court,
but of statutory authorization-under Congress's 1934 Rules Enabling Act.
'Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 73, 92 (1789).
='Swift, 41 US at 14-21.
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cent research of a competent scholar," Justice Brandeis held that
Story's interpretation of Section 34 was wrong: the purpose of the
section was to ensure that in diversity cases the federal courts
will apply unwritten as well as written state law absent a con-
trolling enacted federal law."'
The second, and more controversial, ground of the decision
was a constitutional one. The majority's conclusion that as a
matter of constitutional law "there is no federal general common
law" rested on the traditional doctrine of enumerated powers and
the principle of federalism that it incorporates. According to Jus-
tice Brandeis,
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a State whether they be local in their
nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the
law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts. 2
In other words, the Constitution simply does not grant to any
branch of the federal government-Congress or the federal
courts-the type of general lawmaking authority that the federal
courts had been authorized to exercise in Swift. Consequently,
"in applying the [Swift] doctrine this Court and the lower courts
have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several States." 3
Most of the controversy that the constitutional ground of the
decision has generated relates to its scope and meaning,254 but
some also concerns its necessity given the first ground: in par-
ticular, Justice Brandeis's statement that "[i]f only a question of
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared
to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a cen-
tury."255 In his concurring opinion, Justice Reed for one argued
that the first ground should have sufficed; the majority's decision
to hold the Swift construction of Section 34 unconstitutional in-
stead of merely erroneous was both unnecessary and
"questionable" on the meritsY6 By contrast, the two surviving
'"Erie, 304 US at 72-73 & n 5. The reference was to Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv L Rev 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108
(1923).
'"Erie, 304 US at 78. See also id at 78-80.
'Id at 78. See also id at 78-80.
See, for example, John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv L Rev 693,
700-06 (1974); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 Harv
L Rev 1682, 1683 (1974); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U
Pa L Rev 1231, 1310-24 (1985).
'Erie, 304 US at 77.
' Id at 90-92 (Reed concurring).
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horsemen, Justices Butler and McReynolds, characteristically
seeking to maintain the pre-New Deal era status quo in this area
as in the others that we have considered, defended the Swift doc-
trine and dissented from both grounds of the decision."
The Erie decision itself was far from the New Deal Court's
last word on the subject of "the Erie doctrine." In a series of cases
extending through Guaranty Trust Co v York decided in 1945,11
the Court expanded and extended the doctrine-and with it the
scope of state law and the power of state courts-in a number of
different directions, none of which was clearly implied in the
original decision. The first extension addressed the following is-
sue: precisely which state courts are the federal courts bound to
follow on matters of state law? The lower federal courts did not
initially consider that Erie limited their discretion under Swift to
diverge from decisions of lower state courts, but only from deci-
sions of the highest state courts. In four cases decided on the
same day during the 1940 term, the Supreme Court corrected the
lower federal courts on this important point. In Fidelity Union
Trust Co v Field, the Court held that a federal court in New Jer-
sey was bound to follow a decision of a state trial court, the New
Jersey Court of Chancery, "in the absence of more convincing
evidence of what the state law is."" This was so even though the
decision might not be followed by the higher New Jersey state
courts themselves. In the three other cases, the Court applied
this principle to the decisions of intermediate state appellate
courts."5'
The second general category of post-Erie New Deal era ex-
tensions to the doctrine concerned its application to procedural
law. Erie itself prevented the federal courts from developing their
own substantive common law, but said nothing about the proce-
dural principles to be applied in diversity cases. During 1941, the
Court decided three cases that extended Erie to procedural or
quasi-procedural issues. In Klaxon Co v Stentor Electric Manu-
facturing Co, the Court held there was no general federal law
governing conflict of laws by finding that a federal court in a di-
versity case must employ the choice of law rule of the state in
which it sits rather than its own choice of law rule. It did so on
the basis of the underlying Erie rationale of opting to promote
consistency between federal and state courts within the same
' Id at 80-90 (Butler dissenting).
2326 US 99 (1945).
2311 US 169, 177-78 (1940).
2 Six Companies v Joint Highway District No 13, 311 US 180 (1940); West v AT.&T.,
311 US 223 (1940); Stoner v New York Life Insurance Co, 311 US 464 (1940).
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state rather than (as Swift had sought to promote) uniformity
among federal courts themselves."' On the same day, the Court
held in Griffin v McCoach that federal courts must apply state
rather than federal procedural rules in a statutory interpleader
case.262 Third, in Vandenbark v Owens-Illinois Glass Co, the
Court held that federal courts are bound to follow the most re-
cent authoritative decision of a state court in matters of state law
even when that decision was handed down after the cause of ac-
tion arose or (in the case of a court of appeals) after entry of
judgment by the federal trial court. Thus, where the Ohio Su-
preme Court expressly overruled its precedent barring tort
claims in worker compensation cases after the federal trial court
had dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the basis of this (then-
governing) precedent, the Court held that the federal appeals
court was bound to reverse the trial judge even though his deci-
sion was correct (under the Erie doctrine) when made. The Court
in Vandenbark expressly stated that its decision was contrary to
the federal court practice of ignoring later overruling state court
decisions during the Swift era.2"
The most important extension of the Erie doctrine by the
New Deal Court occurred in Guaranty Trust, decided in 1945. In
this case, the Court determined that although the Erie doctrine
distinguishes between substantive law (which the federal courts
are barred from developing in matters of general common law)
and procedural law (which the federal courts may develop) in di-
versity cases, the distinction between the two depends on the ef-
fect of the law in question on the outcome of the case. If the use
of a federal procedural rule would affect the outcome of the case,
this rule is deemed "substantive" for Erie purposes and thus the
federal court must apply the state procedural law. The Court jus-
tified this "outcome determination test" (as it became known) on
the basis of the Erie rationale that results of litigation should not
turn on whether suit is filed in federal or state court within a
particular state. Applying this test to the issue at hand, the
Court held that a federal court in a diversity case must apply
state and not federal law on the issue of timeliness of suit.
26
' 313 US 487, 496 (1941).
313 US 498, 503-04 (1941). The Federal Interpleader Statute authorizes nationwide
service of process, which of course state courts as a general matter do not. As all first
year students undoubtedly know, interpleader is a device by which a person who admits
an obligation but is unsure to whom it is owed deposits money or property with the court
and serves notice on the possible claimants so that they can dispute ownership among
themselves. Rewards are a classic situation for the use of interpleader.
311 US 538, 540-43 (1941).
326 US at 109-12.
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The Court continued to expand the Erie doctrine until the
mid-1950s,265 but beginning in the late 1950s and continuing un-
til the mid-1960s, the Warren Court not only called a halt to fur-
ther expansion but in a series of cases firmly swung the pendu-
lum back towards the federal courts.
26
B. Abstention
In Erie, the Court reallocated constitutional power between
federal and state judiciaries by holding that federal courts are
bound by the previous decisions of state courts on questions of
state common law arising in diversity cases. By contrast, under
the doctrine of abstention that the New Deal Court created and
developed as an exercise this time in judicial rather than consti-
tutional federalism, the federal courts must in certain specified
circumstances postpone or decline exercising their lawful juris-
diction in order to allow state courts (rather than themselves) to
decide questions of state law raised in cases filed in federal court.
The effects of the two forms of this doctrine developed by the
New Deal Court---Pullman" and "Burford" abstention-were to
transfer jurisdiction of certain types of cases brought in federal
court to state courts, to enhance both the role of state law in
cases brought on both state and federal law grounds and the role
of state courts in interpreting that law, and to promote the inde-
pendence of state government organs in carrying out domestic
policy.
Pullman abstention is named after the 1941 case of Railroad
Commission of Texas v Pullman Co, in which the Court through
Justice Frankfurter held that where the action of a state is chal-
'For example, in Berhardt v Polygraphic Co of America, Inc, 350 US 198, 203 (1956),
the Court stated that the "outcome determination test" required that state law be fol-
lowed wherever a federal procedural rule might conceivably, rather than definitely would,
affect the outcome of the case.
' In Byrd v Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc, 356 US 525, 540 (1958), the
Court restricted the "outcome determination test" by holding that in a diversity case, the
federal standard-under which the decision whether a plaintiff in a negligence case is an
employee for purposes of workmen's compensation is left to the jury-was to apply rather
than the state practice, which left the matter to the judge. The Court stated that the fed-
eral interest in the federal courts as an "independent system for administering justice to
litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction" was a countervailing interest which had to
be balanced against the state's interest in applying its rule and the uniformity and forum-
shopping concerns underlying Erie.
In the 1965 case of Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460, 471-72 (1965), the Court substan-
tially restructured the Erie doctrine by effectively holding that wherever there is a ra-
tional basis for classifying a federal rule as "procedural," that rule can constitutionally be
applied in diversity cases notwithstanding either a contrary state rule or its effect on the
outcome of the litigation. Thus, only in unquestionably substantive matters does Erie ap-
ply to forbid the development of federal common law rules in diversity cases.
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lenged in federal court on the basis both of unsettled state law
and federal constitutional grounds, the federal court should de-
cine to exercise jurisdiction until the state law issue has been
definitively answered by the state courts in the hope that this
will resolve the case and avoid the necessity of addressing the
federal constitutional question."7 In Pullman, the plaintiffs
challenged in federal court an order of the Commission aimed at
preventing black Pullman conductors from being in charge of
sleeping cars, basing their claim on federal constitutional (equal
protection and due process) grounds and also on the Commis-
sion's alleged lack of statutory authority under state law to issue
such an order. Applying the two principles that such "sensitive"
constitutional questions should be answered only if absolutely
necessary and that "needless friction with state policies" should
be avoided where possible, the Court ordered the federal tribunal
to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the case until defini-
tive resolution of whether the order was lawful under state law
had been attained in the course of state court proceedings to be
initiated. Only then, and if their constitutional claims were still
relevant, could the parties return to federal court.2"
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter expressed one of
the major purposes of abstention as follows:
[Under the] doctrine of abstention [which is] appropriate to
our federal system ... the federal courts, "exercising a wise
discretion," restrain their authority because of "scrupulous
regard for the rightful independence of the state govern-
ments" and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.
• ..This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the
courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state
and federal authority without the need of rigorous congres-
sional restriction of those powers.269
After Pullman, the Court frequently required abstention by the
federal courts in similar situations.270 During the 1960s, however,
the Warren Court expressed concern about the inevitable delays
that Pullman abstention entails and in the years following
Frankfurter's retirement in 1962 always found a reason not to
312 US 496, 501 (1941).
Id at 497-502.
'Id at 501, quoting Cavanaugh v Looney, 248 US 453, 457 (1919), and Di Giovanni v
Camden Fire Insurance Association, 296 US 64, 73 (1935).
'See, for example, Shipman v DuPre, 339 US 321, 322 (1950); City of Meridian v
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co, 358 US 639, 640-41 (1959).
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require the federal court to abstain so that the doctrine fell into
disuse.
Burford or "administrative" abstention derives from the 1943
decision in Burford v Sun Oil Co, in which by a five-four majority
the Court held that in an action to enjoin the execution of an or-
der of the Texas Railroad Commission granting Burford a permit
to drill new oil wells, the federal district court-in which suit was
filed on both federal question and diversity grounds-should, "as
a matter of sound equitable discretion," have declined to exercise
jurisdiction and dismissed the case."' Here, as Frankfurter ar-
gued in dissent, there was no uncertainty in the state law as
there was in Pullman since the Texas legislature had established
"narrowly defined standards of law.., for review of the orders of
its Railroad Commission."272 Moreover, both the majority and the
dissenters considered the federal constitutional issue a minor one
and treated the case essentially as one of diversity jurisdiction so
that avoiding the constitutional issue did not appear to be a mo-
tivating factor for the majority.273
Rather, the motivating factor appears to have been exclu-
sively considerations of comity and respect for the capacity of the
states to manage basic issues of state policy on their own, free
from federal interference. According to Justice Black's opinion for
the Court, which quoted from Justice Stone's 1935 opinion in
Pennsylvania v Williams refusing to allow a federal court to as-
sume management of a state building and loan association solely
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, "it 'is in the public interest
that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary
power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state
governments in carrying out their domestic policy."7 4 Arguing
that the specialized system of judicial review established by the
state should not be disturbed, Black continued, "Delay, misun-
derstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the
state policy, are the inevitable product of this double system of
review."275 He concluded that given the adequacy of the state
scheme of judicial review of the Commission's decisions and the
fact that the Court retains the right to review the state supreme
court's handling of any federal questions involved, "a sound re-
spect for the independence of state action requires the federal
-' 319 US 315, 318 (1949).
'Id at 342 (Frankfurter dissenting).
'See id at 318 (majority opinion); id at 344-45 (Frankfurter dissenting).
" Id at 318, quoting Pennsylvania v Williams, 294 US 176, 185 (1935).
'Burford, 319 US at 327.
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equity court to stay its hand."276 In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Douglas also emphasized the special federalism concerns
raised by federal court review of state administrative agencies:
"If the federal courts undertook to sit in review.., of this state
administrative agency, they would in effect actively participate
in the fashioning of the state's domestic policy."277 In a vigorous
dissent, Frankfurter argued that the Pullman factors justifying
abstention were absent here, and that even though he spoke "as
one who has long favored the entire abolition of diversity juris-
diction," he could not condone what amounted to partial abolition
by judicial decree.27
Burford abstention was invoked again by the Court in simi-
lar circumstances and on similar grounds in the 1951 case of
Alabama Public Service Commission v Southern Railway Co,279
but since that time the Court has not ordered abstention on Bur-
ford grounds, although lower federal courts have continued to
rely on this doctrine in the exercise of their discretion."0 During
the 1960s and 1970s, the Court made clear that Burford absten-
tion could not be invoked to exclude federal court jurisdiction in
civil rights cases."
C. Territorial Jurisdiction of State Courts
The topic of territorial (or personal) jurisdiction concerns the
issue of whether a court has authority to compel a defendant to
appear before it. Principles of territorial jurisdiction primarily
operate to limit the geographical reach of a state's judicial power.
In the particular context of the United States, these principles
have been viewed in part through the lens of federalism as a
means of regulating and coordinating the competing claims of
state judicial authorities. Thus, the Supreme Court has over the
years developed rules to regulate such competing claims despite
the fact that the Constitution contains no specific limitations on
each state's assertion of territorial jurisdiction. The New Deal
Court changed the preexisting rules to ones that increased the
territorial reach of each state's judicial authority.
I6 1d at 334.
Id at 335 (Douglas concurring).
Id at 337-39 (Frankfurter dissenting).
341 US 341, 350 (1951).
'See Julia A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State
and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 UC Davis L Rev 1, 15-21 (1986).
"See, for example, McNeese v Board of Education, 373 US 668, 673-74 (1963)
(refusing to order abstention by distinguishing Burford from situation where state ad-
ministrative procedures were used for handling school desegregation disputes).
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The governing set of rules from 1878 until 1945 was estab-
lished in the leading case of Pennoyer v Neff, which premised
them on a theory of state sovereignty. According to this case,
since the states retain their independent existence, the principles
of "public law" apply to them under which "every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory." Conversely, "no State can exercise direct ju-
risdiction and authority over persons or property [outside] its
territory." 2 As Justice Field explained:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by
the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.
Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would
be deemed in every other forum... an illegitimate assump-
tion of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.'
This "territorial" basis for judicial authority required the physical
presence of a defendant or his property within the state and thus
involved valid assertions of jurisdiction that were mutually ex-
clusive. A state court could obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only by service of process within the state-either in
person or by seizing her property in the state, which acts as con-
structive notice of process.2 The Court added that after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the assertion of jurisdic-
tion by a state court in violation of these rules constitutes denial
of due process.'
In the landmark case of International Shoe Co v Washington,
decided in 1945, the Court radically rewrote these rules. This
case involved a Delaware shoe-making corporation based in Mis-
souri with no office or store in Washington that shipped shoes to
customers in that state after soliciting their orders through
commissioned agents who went door-to-door exhibiting samples.
State law treated these agents as employees and in a suit to re-
cover payments from the corporation due to its unemployment
compensation fund, the state served process upon one of the
agents within the state and also by registered mail to the defen-
dant in Missouri. The defendant denied that Washington had
territorial jurisdiction over it since it was not present in the
state.m
'95 US 714, 722 (1877).
Id at 720 (citation omitted).
Id at 723-24.
2Id at 733.
-326 US 310, 312-15 (1945).
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Although in rejecting the defendant's due process claim, the
Court did not expressly overrule Pennoyer but paid lip service to
its requirement of the defendant's presence within a state, its
dilution of the definition of "presence" amounted to a clear rejec-
tion of the territorial basis for jurisdiction that underlay the re-
quirement in favor of rules premised upon notions of fairness.
Henceforth, as Chief Justice Stone explained,
due process requires only that in order to subject a defen-
dant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice." 7
After stating that because the notion of corporate personality is a
fiction, a corporation's "presence" can be manifested only by the
activities of its authorized agents, Stone continued:
[T]he terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to sym-
bolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the
state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process. Those demands may be met by such
contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the par-
ticular suit which is brought there.2"
Thus, if a corporate defendant satisfies this reasonableness test,
it is deemed "present" in the state for jurisdictional purposes; it
does not pass the test because it is "present."
Clearly, unlike the territorial basis of personal jurisdiction, a
reasonableness test does not involve bright line rules but de-
pends rather "upon the quality and nature of the activity in rela-
tion to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Applying
these standards, the Court found that the defendant's systematic
and continuous activity within the state, where it enjoyed the
benefits and protections of the state's laws, established sufficient
contacts with the state to render the state's attempts to enforce
the obligations thereby incurred eminently reasonable."9
Justice Black wrote a separate opinion to voice his disa-
greement with what he considered the majority's vague and ille-
'Id at 316, quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 (1940).
'Id at 316-17 (citation omitted).
29Id at 319-20.
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gitimately activist "natural law" standard that would introduce
unnecessary uncertainty and did not go far enough in the direc-
tion of aflirming state judicial authority. According to Black, by
announcing "vague Constitutional criteria," the Court had
"introduced uncertain elements... tending to curtail the exercise
of State power to an extent not justified by the Constitution."29
He then continued:
I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State,
without any "ifs" and "buts," a power to tax and to open the
doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corporations whose
agents do business in those States. Believing that the Con-
stitution gave the States that power, I think it a judicial
deprivation to condition its exercise upon this Court's notion
of "fair play," however appealing that term may be." 1
Despite Black's reservations about the qualifications at-
tached by the majority to the expansion of state judicial author-
ity, that this was the effect of International Shoe cannot be
doubted. Justice Thurgood Marshall later summed up the con-
tent and impact of the new rules as follows:
[T~he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of
the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the
central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction. The
immediate effect of this departure from Pennoyer's concep-
tual apparatus was to increase the ability of the state courts
to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants.292
D. Choice of Law
In an analogous fashion to its restructuring of the personal
jurisdiction of state courts, the Court in this period also substan-
tially reduced the constitutional restrictions on the ability of
state courts to apply domestic substantive law in cases with
multi-state implications. As one leading commentator put it, "the
1930s witnessed a retreat from [previous] rigid limitations on a
state's opportunity to apply its own law to cases with which it
had contact[s]." 3 As with personal jurisdiction, during the New
Id at 323 (Black concurring in judgment) (citation omitted).
Id at 324-25.
' Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186, 204 (1977) (footnote omitted).
'James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 Cornell L Rev
185, 230 (1976).
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Deal period the Court rejected the old territorial approach under
which it was assumed there was only one constitutionally per-
missible law to be applied in each case. Although this fundamen-
tal change in approach began in 1930, it was not until further re-
finements were made in the middle and at the end of the decade
that this change was translated into Court decisions routinely
upholding the application of forum law against constitutional
challenge. By thus putting the "choice" into choice of law, the net
result of the Court's activity was once again to enhance the con-
stitutional powers of state courts and also the potential authority
within each state of its laws.
Prior to the 1930 case of Home Insurance Co v Dick,294 the
predominant territorial-vested-rights theory of Joseph Beale's
First Restatement had been virtually constitutionalized by the
Supreme Court, under the rubric of the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses.295 Under the sway of this theory, with
its assumption that there is only one applicable law to a given
case, the Court vigorously policed parochial choice of law by state
courts. In Dick, the Court declared unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause the Supreme Court of Texas's affirmation of
the trial court's decision to apply a two-year Texas statute of
limitations in a dispute over a contract entered into and per-
formed in Mexico, and made between Mexican residents, rather
than a one-year contract provision that was in accord with Mexi-
can law to which the contract was expressly made subject.296 De-
spite this result, however, the reasoning of Justice Brandeis's
opinion appeared to reject the territorial premise that if Mexican
law applied to this case properly filed in a Texas court, then un-
der any conceivable circumstances Texas law could not. Rather,
the basis for the decision was that on the particular facts of the
case there were insufficient contacts with Texas to justify the ap-
plication of its statute of limitations, with the implication that
greater contacts might have permitted the state court to choose
whether to apply Texas or Mexican law.297
2m281 US 397 (1930).
'US Const, Art IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." See, for example,
New York Life Insurance Co v Dodge, 246 US 357, 369-73 (1918) (Where a contract for a
life insurance policy was bought in Missouri and covered a Missouri domiciliary, but was
completed by acceptance of the company's home office in New York, the company's rights
vested under New York law which must accordingly be applied by the Missouri court un-
der the Due Process Clause.).
"Dick, 281 US at 407.
" Id at 408.
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In the four years following this first modern case, the Court
consolidated its new "significant contacts" approach to the consti-
tutional limitations on choice of law, but this approach did not
prevent it from continuing routinely to invalidate applications by
a state of its own law.298 From 1935 on, however, the Court up-
held the application of forum law by state courts against due
process and full faith and credit challenges in every major choice
of law case that it decided. This change in outcomes was
prompted by two further refinements of its new approach. In the
1935 case of Alaska Packers Assn v Industrial Accident Commis-
sion of California, the Court introduced the idea of "interest
analysis," under which the governmental interests of the com-
peting state jurisdictions are appraised and the party challenging
the "prima facie right" of every state to enforce its own statutes
in its own courts assumes the burden of showing that the inter-
ests of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.2" Four
years later, in Pacific Employers Insurance Co v Industrial Acci-
dent Commission, the Court went even further towards reducing
its function in choice of law cases by rendering this prima facie
right virtually irrebuttable where a statute of the forum state de-
clares itself to apply exclusively to persons and events inside the
state.3" As a result of these developments, together with later
more interstitial ones, a number of scholars in the field have ex-
pressed the view that it is unclear if there are now any constitu-
tional limitations on state choice of law."0 '
'See, for example, Bradford Electric Light Co v Clapper, 286 US 145, 154-55 (1932)
(application of forum law by federal district court in New Hampshire rather than Ver-
mont Workmen's Compensation Act violated full faith and credit); Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co v Delta & Pine Land Co, 292 US 143, 150 (1934) (state court could not ap-
ply its own statute to an insurance contract case where interest of the forum had slight
connection to substance of the contract).
"294 US 532, 547-48 (1935). In Alaska Packers, the Court held that the state in
which the employment relationship had been formed could apply its own worker compen-
sation law to an employee injured in another state.
"306 US 493, 503-05 (1939) (holding that state of employment does not have a spe-
cial interest to which state court in state where accident occurred is required to defer un-
der full faith and credit). The third major choice of law case of this period was Skiriotes v
Florida, 313 US 69, 77 (1941) (state's interest in regulating conduct of its citizens permits
it to apply its law outside state's territorial waters).
"See, for example, the section entitled, "Scholarly Reaction to Hague," in James A.
Martin, Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials 338-42 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1984). Despite
this scholarly skepticism, the Court reaffirmed that there are some such limitations by
holding in 1985 that the application of Kansas law to all claims arising under a class ac-
tion suit against a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma
brought by plaintiffs from all fifty states was sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed
constitutional limits. Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797 (1985).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The New Deal period is almost universally understood as
one of the few truly fundamental watersheds in American consti-
tutional history, dividing the modern era from what went be-
fore. 2 1I terms of specifying the precise nature of the constitu-
tional revolution that was wrought, a second account often coex-
ists as part of the current received wisdom alongside the nation-
alist one on which I have focused in this Article. This is that the
Roosevelt era Court brought about an economic revolution: a
revolution in the relationship of government to the economy. In
this account, the Court rejected the enhanced constitutional
status previously afforded contract and property rights that had
resulted in the marking off of a sphere ruled by market outcomes
and common law baselines with which government was pre-
sumptively forbidden to interfere.0 3
This is all, of course, extremely familiar. What is perhaps
less familiar is the notion that these two standard accounts-the
nationalist and the economic--ought to, but generally do not, co-
exist uneasily with each other since they are substantially in con-
flict. They are in conflict because the nationalist account asserts
that during the New Deal era, the constitutional authority of the
states was reduced, while the economic account asserts that the
authority of all governments, including state governments, was
'As I stated above, see note 5, with one exception the work of recent "revisionist"
historians of the New Deal era does not challenge the notion that what the Supreme
Court did in this period amounted to a constitutional revolution; rather it challenges the
timing (1937), and the explanation (response to outside pressures) of this revolution.
See, for example, Ackerman, We the People (cited in note 1) (the Reconstruction era
constitutional amendments that We the People rejected in 1937 contained the two princi-
ples of (1) enhanced constitutional protection for contract and property rights, and (2)
limited federal power); Horwitz, Transformation of American Law at 3 (cited in note 1)
(In addition to the nationalist revolution, there was "a fundamental shift in the constitu-
tional relationship of government to the economy.").
Although this second account thus often exists alongside the nationalist one, it is
typically subordinated to the latter. For example, despite the two principles that Acker-
man states We the People rejected in 1937, he focuses almost exclusively on the second
one and the task of justifying the Supreme Court's switch from opposing to embracing
FDR's legislative program and activist national government. Similarly, although Sun-
stein acknowledges both the economic (the New Deal revolution involved a general rejec-
tion of common law or market baselines for distinguishing between governmental "action"
and "inaction7) and nationalist (it also involved rejecting "traditional notions of federal-
ism") characterizations of the constitutional revolution, see Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at
425 (cited in note 1), his analysis of enhanced governmental power focuses on the en-
hanced federal government power and the new federal administrative state. Indeed, his
discussion is so colored by the nationalist understanding that he criticizes the New Deal
for carrying too far the faith in national rather than local regulation. Id at 505. In his dis-
cussion too, Horwitz focuses on the relationship of the federal government to the econ-
omy.
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expanded.3"' One resolution of this conflict is to reject the nation-
alist account as presenting a distorted and simplistic picture of
the revolution as a whole as I have suggested. By focusing exclu-
sively on Congress's commerce power and ignoring other major
constitutional changes, including changes that enhanced state
power over commerce, the straightforward nationalist story is
unable to comprehend the larger picture in which an increase in
federal powers went hand-in-hand with the states being direct
beneficiaries of much that the Court did in this period.
But my analysis also suggests that the economic account,
though true, is only a partial truth. Whereas the nationalist story
is distorted because it focuses exclusively on the Commerce
Clause, the only additional change that proponents of the eco-
nomic account generally take into account is the death of sub-
stantive due process, 5 to the exclusion of the other enhance-
ments of state power that I have identified. The fact that reason-
able regulation by both state and federal governments of
"private" economic activity was now constitutionally permissible
for the first time tells us little about the scaling back of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, Congress's power of preemption, and
the incorporation doctrine, or the various increases in state judi-
cial power that occurred. And yet, as we have seen, these were
important and quite typical-if overlooked-components of the
revolution.
The most central and all-embracing feature of the constitu-
tional revolution, one that underlies all the changes made, is in
fact the one that emerged clearly and unequivocally from the
mouths of the revolutionaries themselves. They viewed the ac-
tivist federal courts as the chief culprits of the previous era and,
as a result, reallocated power from them to state and federal
legislatures-and to state courts-by substantially reducing the
scope of judicial review. In place of the elaborate and distinct
doctrinal structures that had been erected around various consti-
tutional clauses to hem in governmental actors, henceforth they
would be subject only to a reasonableness test absent clear limi-
tations in the text of the Constitution. Accordingly, the revolution
'The gravitational pull of the nationalist account that is generally responsible for
the failure to acknowledge the direct enhancement of state power in many areas of con-
stitutional law is also responsible, I believe, for the failure to appreciate the tension be-
tween the two accounts. Since regulation is assumed to mean national regulation, the two
accounts are mistakenly thought in effect to be two sides of the same coin.
Sunstein also takes into account the Contracts Clause. See note 19.
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was not essentially or primarily an attack on either the states
and their regulatory abilities or on contract and property rights;
its target was first and foremost the public policymaking preten-
sions of the federal judiciary.
The fact that the constitutional revolution of the New Deal
period unshackled and empowered the states in so many differ-
ent areas also suggests that the standard contemporary connec-
tion between support for the role of the "states as states" and po-
litical conservatism is a contingent and not a necessary one. It
was the particular and specific alignment of forces that during
the Warren Court era pitted the federal government (courts,
Congress, and President) against those using the rhetoric of
"states' rights" to oppose civil rights and racial desegregation, as
it had been during the Civil War era and the battle over slavery.
During the years between these two eras on which this Article
has focused, however, the context and alignment of forces was
quite different. To a significant degree, the Lochner era federal
courts took the lead in constraining state power in order to resist
the reformist agendas of the Populist and Progressive move-
ments, which had their greatest triumphs at the state legislative
level and threatened to undermine what the courts viewed as the
twin constitutional norms of freedom of contract and the national
economy. In rejecting the notion that these norms are inscribed
in the Constitution, and thereby liberating the states to do their
part in the task, the Roosevelt era Court realized the vision ex-
pressed by Justice Brandeis in the course of a powerful dissent
from a 1932 decision invalidating a state statute on substantive
due process grounds: "There must be power in the States and the
Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic prac-
tices and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs." 06
'New State Ice Co v Liebman, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting).
